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In the District of Columbia... one out of every three students drop out before
they finish high school. A new study done: three-fourths of the nation's
schoolchildren are unable to compose an organized, coherent essay. All across the
country--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans---the Catholic school
system, more than half of those students are non-Catholic, most of them black,
many of them with a single mom. They have decided the public schools don't
work for their kid, and they want to stop the experimentation on their child. And
they have chosen to send their kid to a Catholic school, even though they're non-
Catholic. And 99 percent of them go on to college. Why don't those poor,
minority mons with their kids, who could not possibly deal with the chaos of
public school, deserve a break?
Tim Russert, questioning Vice-President Gore
on NBC's "Meet The Press"'
I. INTRODUCTION
An interesting exchange occurred during the December 19,
1999 appearance of Senator Bradley and Vice-President Gore on
NBC's "Meet The Press." During a discussion on
"education"--they were both "for it," of course--the Vice-
President managed to dumbfound Bradley with his unyielding
opposition to school choice. Here is an excerpt:
MR. RUSSERT: Let me turn to education. Senator
Bradley,... [y]ou supported a[n] experimental program of
vouchers throughout the country. As president, would you
support tuition tax credits and vouchers?
MR. BRADLEY: The answer is, Tim, that-no. And I will tell
you why. I have supported vouchers on an experimental basis
on a number of occasions over 18 years. I do not believe that
vouchers are the answers to the problems of public
education.... Every time I voted for vouchers, I voted for it as
an experimental basis and I also said that I would not take any
public money that was set aside for schools. This would be new
money in order to do this experiment.... There are
experiments out there in the country today and those
experiments are in Cleveland and Milwaukee .... And if those
experiments demonstrated that the quality of public education
1. Meet the Press: V-e-President Al Gore and Former Senator Bill Bradley Discuss Numerous
Political Topics (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Meet the Press].
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was improved because of the competition, I think that it would
be very difficult to turn your back on that evidence .... Well,
I'd like to ask Al, if the experiments demonstrated that the
quality of public education was improved, does that mean that
you would not even consider vouchers?
VICE PRES. GORE: You know, I favor competition, Bill. I favor
competition within the public school system. I favor more
choice for parents to send their children to whatever school
they want to send them to. But the reason I oppose vouchers,
Tim, is because even if you say it's not going to come from
public school budgets, it does because history shows,
experience shows there's a set amount of money that
communities have been willing to spend on education. And if
you drain the money away from the public schools for private
vouchers, then that hurts the public schools. Now, Bill, every
time...
MR. BRADLEY: What does that mean? Wat does that mean?2
The Vice-President went on to insist that, while unalterably
opposed to school choice (yet somehow, at the same time, in
favor of "more choice for parents to send their children to
whatever school they want to send them to"), he nonetheless
supports "truly revolutionary improvements" like "testing all new
teachers," "rigorous peer review of current teachers," "closing
down failing schools [and] reopening them under a new plan,"
"reducing the class size," and "wiring every classroom and library
to the Internet." 3 We are now through the looking glass, where
"testing teachers" and "closing failing schools" are "revolutionary
improvements," but educational choice for parents and freedom
for children are anathema.
As if to supply the drama that even a relatively interesting
presidential debate cannot manage to provide, the next day
Judge Solomon Oliver of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio ruled that the experimental choice
program in Cleveland, mentioned above by Senator Bradley, was
an unconstitutional establishment of religion.4 Judge Oliver
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. Id.; cf. Floyd H. Flake, Gore'sAchiesHee4 N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at A15 (noting
that "Mr. Gore did not answer [the] question in any real way. That won't do.").
4. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999). The court
stayed its order pending review by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The case is
set for briefing in the Spring of 2000. For a useful introduction to the ClevelandScholarship and Tutoring Program, see generally Margaret A. Nero, Case Comment, The
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answered the question posed by "Meet The Press" moderator
Tim Russert about the "single moms" who "have decided the
public schools don't work for their kid, and ... want to stop the
experimentation on their child."5 Russert asked, '"Why don't
those poor, minority moms with their kids, who could not
possibly deal with the chaos of public school, deserve 
a break?"6
Here is why, according to Judge Oliver:
Because of the overwhelmingly large number of religious
versus nonreligious schools participating in the Voucher
Program, beneficiaries cannot make a genuine, independent
choice of what school to attend. A program that is so skewed
toward religion necessarily results in indoctrination
attributable to the government and provides financial
incentives to attend religious schools.7
That is, by offering low-income children in Cleveland a chance
to escape that city's troubled public schools, the State of Ohio
was, in effect, bribing kids to submit to government-sponsored
religious indoctrination. The State had failed to dragoon
enough non-religious schools into sharing with religious schools
the mission of serving these children.
As we intend to suggest with the title of this Article, the
identification of school choice as a "conservative" or "religious
right" issue is difficult to square with the fact that the push for
school choice seems to come as much from a passion for social
justice as from the simple economism of the stereotypical
Chamber-of-Commerce or green-eye-shade Republican. School
choice is not a typical political issue:
The politics of education reform are a mystery. Millionaire
businessmen and conservative activists invoke civil rights ideals
to demand equality, freedom, and diversity in
education--while liberals join union bosses and anti-religious
activists in support of a government monopoly. Strange days
indeed, when the NAACP's and ACLU's opponents are black
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Wy Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the
Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103 (1997).
5. Meet The Press, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d at 865.
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schoolchildren singing "We Shall Overcome" on the
courthouse steps.8
Maybe these are, in the words of a regular Sports Illustrated
feature, sure "signs that the Apocalypse is upon us."
Consider Labor Day weekend, 1999: not many hours before
Detroit's scandalously neglected school-children were to return
to school, thousands of public-school teachers and education
bureaucrats took to the streets of Detroit to protest, among
other things, a new requirement that they show up for work on a
regular basis. 9 A few days earlier, Judge Oliver was dubbed the
"voucher vulture"'0  when he preliminarily enjoined the
Cleveland school-voucher program just before the start of the
new school year. Judge Oliver handed down his decision after
only a few weeks' consideration of the case, notwithstanding the
ruling of Ohio's own Supreme Court that the choice program
satisfied First Amendment requirements." (Private citizens and
religious groups stepped in quickly to help children stay in their
8. Richard W. Garnett, The Justice of School Choice, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 13, 1999, at34, 34 (reviewing JOSEPH P. VITEmIrr, CHOOSING EQUALITY SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999)); see also Emily Van Dunk, Exploring the Marketfor School Choice EDUC. WK, Sept. 16, 1998, at 39, 40 (describing coalition of school-
choice conservatives and political liberals in Cleveland and Milwaukee).
9. See Editorial, Enforce the Strike Law, DET. NEws, Aug. 31, 1999, at A8 ("[T]eachers
objected to accountability measures... such as refusing raises to teachers who are
repeatedly absent from class ... ."); Robyn Meredith, On Eve of New School Year, DetroitTeachers Vote to Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at A14 ("[T]he 11,500 member union
was seeking... the elimination of certain policies, including what teachers called too-
rigid attendance requirements."). Interestingly, at the same time the Detroit teachers
were planning their strike, Michigan's State Board of Canvassers approved the petition
of a Michigan pro-choice group called Kids Firstl YESI, which is aiming to remove a 30-year old anti-voucher provision from that State's constitution. See Mark Hombeck,
Voucher Petitions Approved: Campaign Drive Next for Ballot Plan to Allow Tax Dollarsfor Private,Religious Education, DET. NEWs, Aug. 25, 1999, at BI. As of February 2000, Kids Firstl had
collected enough signatures to get its proposal on the ballot. See Group Gets Voucher
Proposal CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2000, at 3.
10. Editorial, Voucher Vulture:Judge's Last-Minute Ruling Will Throw Families, Schools intoNeedless Fear and Confusion, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 25, 1999, at lOB ("A federaljurist who is supposed to serve the public good served no one very well yesterday. Byissuing his ruling on Cleveland's voucher-school experiment less than 18 hours before
schools were to open, U.S. DistrictJudge Solomon OliverJr. created chaos not only for
voucher families, but for the entire Cleveland system.").
11. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211 (Ohio 1999); William Claiborne,Cleveland's School VoucherProgram Halted, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1999, at A2; DirkJohnson,Many Cleveland Parents Frantic as VoucherRulingLimits Choice N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, atAll ("'This can't be true, it just can't be,' [one mother] recalled saying, over and
over. ... 'It was like somebody stabbed me in the heart.'"); Editorial, Suffer the Children,WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1999, at A17 ("Is there no limit to the mind-numbing hostility
toward religion displayed by America's courts? Apparently not. On the very day before
school was set to start, [Judge Oliver] thought nothing of throwing the lives of 3,800Cleveland children into disarray by blocking the city's landmark voucher program.").
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chosen schools.) 12 And President Clinton chose, for his Labor
Day photo-op, to stand in front of a crumbling and over-
crowded school in Norfolk, Virginia, as union leaders Sandra
Feldman and John Sweeney-whose special-interest groups have
consistently resisted meaningful reforms-stood beaming
behind him."3 Yet we are left with Tim Russert's question: Why
don't "poor, minority moms with their kids, who could not
possibly deal with the chaos of public school, deserve a break?"
4
As a recent pro-voucher convert put it: "As a parent of an urban
public high-school student, I flinch at anything that drains
resources from public schools. But I have choices. Keeping
[choices] from others because of a vague threat seems
increasingly hard to justify."" Arthur Levine, President of
Columbia University Teachers College, put the matter more
bluntly:
Throughout my career, I have been an opponent of school
voucher programs.... However, after much soul-searching, I
have reluctantly concluded that a limited school voucher
program is now essential for the poorest Americans attending
the worst public schools .... Today, to force children into
inadequate schools is to deny them any chance of success. To
do so simply on the basis of their parents' income is a sin.'r
Americans care about education (or so they tell pollsters).17 So
do politicians. The country spends billions annually to teach its
children, and even supposed fiscal hawks believe more should
12. SeeJohn Bacon et al., Ohio Voucher Supporters Raise Funds for Students, USA TODAY,
Aug. 31, 1999, at 3A.
13. SeeJohn M. Broder, Clinton as Laborer in Campaign for Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1999, at A16. For more on how the teachers unions have stifled meaningful reform in
American education, see generally, for example, MYRON LIEBERMAN, THE TEACHER
UNIONS (1997); MYRON LIEBERMAN, MARKET SOLUTIONSTO THE EDUCATION CRISIS (Cato
Inst. Policy Analysis No. 75, 1986); Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti, New York The
Obsolete Factory, in NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY 17 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P.
Viteritti eds., 1997); Thomas Toch et al., Why Teachers Don't Teach, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 26, 1996, at 62.
14. Meet The Press, supra note 1.
15. Geneva Overholser, Coming Around on Vouchers, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1999, at
A15.
16. Arthur Levine, Why I'm Reluctantly Backing Vouchers, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998, at
A28.
17. See Dan Balz & Claudia Deane, McCain, Bradley Gain in N.H. Poll; Outsider Role
Plays Well With Voters, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1999, at Al ("On issues, preserving Social
Security and Medicare, improving education and keeping the economy going are the top
three concerns of voters nationally ....").
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be spent on education.'8 Yet many Americans think they do not
come close to getting their money's worth. 9 Everyone seems to
agree that change----'truly revolutionary improvements," in the
Vice-President's words--is needed. But it is hard to see how
meaningful reforms in public education are possible so long as
the universe of options is constrained by special interests'
political muscle, by myths about a common-school tradition,"
and by a misguided suspicion toward religious schools. 2'
It is not a new idea, but school choice's appeal is growing.22 An
increasing number of policymakers, education experts,
politicians, and, perhaps most important, low-income parents,2
18. See Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Bipartisan Vote in House Clears Spending Plan,
WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1999, at Al ("[T]he Republicans boasted of more spending for
education ... than requested by the President.").
19. See, e.g., ANDREWJ. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION 102 (1999) ("A 1995 survey ofNew York State residents do not believe that the public school system is giving them a
good value for their money.").
20. See, e.g., Ted Forstmann, Editorial, Break Up the Education Monopoly, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 1999, at A26 ("The U.S., we are led to believe, was founded upon a system ofgovernment-provided education; tinker with it, and you tinker with the underpinnings of
our democracy. In reality, government-delivered education--a.k.a 'public education'-
wasn't established until roughly a century after our country's founding. The system it
replaced-the system of education our country was founded upon-was characterized
above all by diversity, competition and choice."). For more on America's attachment to
the "common school" myth, the common-school movement's roots in anti-immigrant
and anti-Catholic prejudice, and how the legal and rhetorical legacies of this prejudice
continue to shape the school-choice debate, see, for example, CHARLES LESLIE GLENN,
JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND
THE NON-PUBLiC SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987); VrTERrrro, supra note 8, at 145-79.
21. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 375, 385 (1999) (describing place of anti-
Catholicism and negative stereotypes about Catholic education in the development of
modem Establishment Clause doctrine).
22. In 1999, Florida enacted a law giving students at poorly performing schools
vouchers to pay for tuition at private schools. See Arguments on Vouchers Fill the Air, Lawyers
in Circuit Court Debated Whether Tax Money Can Be Used to Pay Private Schools, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2000, at D4. Fifty-eight children attended private schools with
vouchers the first year of the program. See id. The Florida Education Association and
Florida's branch of the NAACP, among others, challenged the law as violating the
Florida and U.S. constitutions. See id. Recently, a Florida trial court struck down the
program on state-constitutional grounds. SeeJodi Wilgoren, Florida Case Casts Shadow of
Doubt Across the Future of School Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2000, at A18. In New
Mexico, Governor GaryJohnson supports a plan to give vouchers, worth approximately$3,200 each, to parents to send their children to public, private, or religious schools. See
Loie Fecteau, Senate Panel Tables Voucher Plan Despite Pleas, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 11,
2000, at A10. Thus far Johnson has met resistance in the state legislature. See id. In
Michigan, a proposition is likely to be on the ballot in November that would alter the
state constitution to allow tax dollars to pay for private-school tuition. See Karen Schulz,
Voucher Group Certain of Spot on FallBallo GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 24, 2000, at Al.
23. See, eg., COULSON, supra note 19, at 17-21 (gathering data on parents' support for
school choice and vouchers);James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at Al (citing a 1997 Gallup poll showing that 72% of black
parents supported school vouchers); Floyd H. Flake, How Do We Save Inner-City Children?,
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believe that real school choice is the best hope for increasing
educational opportunity and equality for all.24 For example, the
parents of 1.25 million low-income children----"almost 1 out of
every 50 schoolchildren in America"--trapped in failing public
schools responded recently to Ted Forstmann and John
Walton's offer of forty thousand private-school scholarships.26
Recipients of a grant were required to put up $1,000 of their
own money to supplement the scholarship. As Forstmann put it,
"That's $5 billion that poor families were willing to spend simply
to escape the schools where their children have been
relegated." 7 Many believe that only educational freedom can
save public education from the government schools.
28
This Article is intended to be a primer on the legality and
morality of educational choice-"School Choice in a Nutshell,"
if you will.2 We are resigned to being pre-empted by the tireless
work of grassroots activists, the choices of voters, and the
decisions of judges. Still, we hope, in somewhat polemical
fashion, to establish two basic claims. First, school choice,
POL'YREV.,Jan-Feb. 1999, at 48;JeffJacoby, The PoorFavor School Choice, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 27, 1999, atA19 ("[A]mong Milwaukee residents with very low incomes, a whopping
81 percent favor vouchers."); Michael W. Lynch, Rampaging Toward Choice, REASON, Jan.
2000, at 24, 26 ("Polls show that school choice is far more popular with minorities than
with whites, and most popular with low- and modest-income minorities."); Nina Shokraii
Rees, School Reform, AMEi. ENTERPRISE, Nov-Dec. 1998, at 60, 61 (dting a 1997 poll
which found that 87% of African Americans between the ages of 26 and 35 support
school choice). But see William Raspberry, A Little Knowledge Can Be a Meaningless Thing
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1999, at A23 (suggesting that parents' support for school choice is
generally uninformed).
24. According to a recent study by Policy Analysis for California Education, 7.8
million children-15%--took advantage of public-school choice in 1999, and another
10%-5.8 million children-of children attend private schools. See POLICY ANALYSIS FOR
CAL. EDUC., SCHOOL CHOICE: ABUNDANT HOPES, SCARCE EVIDENCE OF RESULTS add.
(1999) (citing national data from the National Center for Education Statistics).
25. Jacoby, supra note 28.
26. See Forstmann, supra note 20. For more on Forstmann and Walton's project, see
Children's Scholarship Fund (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.scholarshipfund.org>.
27. Jacoby, supra note 23.
28. It is important to distinguish public education-the provision by the government
of access to quality education--from government-rnn public schools. See COULSON, supra
note 19, at 391 ("What kind of school system can best fulfill the public's educational
goals? ... Many people retain a certain fondness for public schooling .... But is that
fondness really for the institution of public schooling, or for the ideals of public
education?").
29. West Publishing Company puts out the "Nutshell" series of small, concise
summaries of different legal subjects. See, e.g.,JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1995). These books have saved many law students
who could not be bothered with, for example, their International Business Transactions
assignments during the N.CA.A basketball tournament.
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properly understood, is constitutional. And second, school
choice is both sensible and just.
In the end, we believe "school choice.., is essential to
achieving equality of opportunity for American children, rich or
poor. School choice treats the poor as citizens of equal dignity; it
promotes the independence upon which constitutional
government depends; and it empowers parents to transmit their
values to their children."m It is educational choice, not
government monopoly, that best resonates with America's
constitutional ideals, its cultural diversity and commitment to
pluralism, and its tradition of religious freedom. It is choice, not
monopoly, that "promise[s] to invigorate public life, create
more capable citizens, bring together the races, and make good
on the Constitution's promises."3'
II. SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There is little point to thinking and arguing about whether we
ought to expand parental choice in education if the
Constitution says we cannot. And so, we first outline the basic
argument that, contrary to Judge Oliver's December 1999 ruling
in the Cleveland choice case, 2 the United States Constitution3-
specifically, the First Amendment's "Establishment Clause"t --
30. Garnett, supra note 8, at 36.
31. Id.; see alsoVITERIrrl, supra note 8, at 180-208.
32. SeeSimmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
33. Of course, the various states' constitutions may or may not speak to school choice.
See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211-16 (Ohio 1999) (concluding that
the Cleveland choice program did not violate the Ohio constitution);Jackson v. Benson,
578 N.W.2d 602, 620-28 (Wis. 1998) (concluding that the Milwaukee choice program did
not violate the Wisconsin constitution); Wilgoren, supra note 22 (noting that Florida
voucher program violates Florida constitution). In fact, it is likely that the states'
constitutions--many of which contain relatively new provisions that were inserted into
law specifically to prevent students from using public money to attend Catholic
schools-will, in the long run, pose more significant barriers to choice-based reform
than will the First Amendment. SeegenerallyJoseph P. Viteritii, Blaine's Wake: School Choice,
the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY' 657 (1998)(discussing Blaine amendments in state constitutions and the stricter standards of
separation between church and government in many states).
34. Professor MaryAnn Glendon and others have observed that the First Amendment
would perhaps have been better read as containing one Freedom of Religion Clause, and
not two, warring, clauses, one dealing with free exercise and the other with non-
establishment. See MaryAnn Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 Mic-. L.
REV. 477, 492 (1991) ("A single coherent provision that on its face seemed to protect
freedom of religion by forbidding Congress to establish religion or otherwise burden
free exercise became two 'clauses' with free exercise regularly subordinated to a broad
notion of nonestablishment."); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981)(Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("The ... cause of the tension [between the Free Exercise and
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permits governments to enact, fund, and administer meaningful
school-choice programs. 5
A. Real School Choice
Before discussing the constitutionality of "school choice," it is
necessary to define what "school choice" is. As Vice-President
Gore's December 1999 remarks on "Meet The Press" illustrate,
the term has more than one meaning. The public
overwhelmingly supports the admittedly vague concept of
increased choice in education, but it is not always clear that the
public knows what it is supporting. It is no surprise, then, that
everyone manages to be for something that can plausibly be
called "school choice." For example, President Clinton, Vice-
President Gore, and a few free-thinking teachers unions claim to
support "controlled choice"' measures like charter schools, 9
Establishment Clauses] is our overly expansive interpretation of both Clauses. By broadly
construing both clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel between the
Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action must pass in order to
survive constitutional scrutiny.").
35. There have been dozens of scholarly and other articles discussing the
constitutionality of school-choice programs, and we have been influenced by many of
them. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An
Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutiona and
Why They're Not 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 397 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, The
Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 375 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and
the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 311 (1986); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on Equal Access'for Religious Speakers
and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public
Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243
(1996); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishmen 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POLY 341 (1999). The upshot of all this scholarship seems to be an emerging
consensus that "the Court would uphold an educational voucher scheme that would
permit parents to decide which schools, public or private, their children should attend."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10, at 1223 (2d ed. 1988).
36. Meet The Press, supra note 1 ("I favor more choice for parents to send their
children to whatever school they want to send them to.").
37. SeeRaspberry, supranote 23.
38. VITERITTI, supra note 8, at 58.
39. See, e.g., Marilyn Brown, WhateverElse They Are, Charter Schools Are Hot, TAMPA TRIB.,
Nov. 21, 1999, at 6; Charter Schools to Receive Aid; Clinton Lauds Idea, Grants $95 Million,
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1999, at A12; June Kronholz, Gore 10-Year, $115 Billion Schools Plan
Includes Aid for Teachers in Poor Areas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1999, at A16 ("Mr. Gore also
called for tripling the number of charter schools, which are publicly funded schools that
aren't part of the regular school-district bureaucracy."); Ed Mendel, Top Teachers Union
Backing of New Charter School a Rarity, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 4,1999, at A3.
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magnet schools," and both intra-district and inter-district public-
school choice. 1 In his 1999 State of the Union address,
President Clinton boasted, "[w]hen I became president, there
was one independent public charter school in America. With
our support, there are 1,100 today. My budget assures that early
in the next century, there will be 3,000.""4 Although this support
is probably best understood as political cover for opposition to
more meaningful choice-based reforms,3 controlled-choice
measures like charter schools are up and running in many states,
raise few constitutional questions, and could be the only
politically feasible alternatives to the current education
monopoly.
It is also true that "controlled choice" reforms-charter
schools in particular-appear to be working in the few states
where they are permitted to be what they are touted as: truly
independent and experimental public schools." Unfortunately,
charter schools are more often undermined by the same
unreasonable regulatory burdens they were created to
circumvent.4 As a result, most charter-school laws fall to create
40. See, e.g., Thomas Toch et al., Schools that Work: Magnet Schools that Limit Admissions
Are a Proven Way to Educational Excellence, but They Raise Some Difficult Questions About
Equity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 27, 1991, at 58.
41. See generally VrrERrrrI, supra note 8, at 53-79 (canvassing various controlled-choice
measures and their results).
42. Editorial, Charter Hypocrisy, WALL ST.J., Oct. 20, 1999, at A26. The President made
essentially the same promise in his 2000 address.
43. See VrrEaRr, supra note 8, at 71 ("For Democratic politicians aligned with
teachers unions and other education groups, [charter schools] represented a convenient
compromise on choice . ").
44. See, e.g., Daniel Golden, Common Prayer: Old-Time Religion Gets a Boost at a Chain of
Charter Schools, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1999, at Al (noting that approximately 400,000
children are enrolled in charter schools and describing one chain of "back to basics"
charter schools); Robert Maranto & Scott Milliman, In Arizona, Charter Schools Work,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1999, at A25; Dennis McCafferty, The Best Little School in Texas-and
Maybe America, USA WEEKEND, Nov. 21, 1999, at 16. For more on charter schools
generally, see, for example, BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE (1999);
Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legal Issues for Legislatures,
1998 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 69; David Osborne, Healthy Competition: The Benefits of Charter
Schools, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1999, at 31.
45. See, e.g., Charter Hypocrisy, supra note 42 ("When it comes to actual treatment of
the nation's fledgling charter schools, the Clinton Administration follows another policy:
It tortures them."); Garnett, supra note 8, at 35 ("What Joseph P. Viteritti] calls
'Potemkin bills that pretend to be serious reforms but lack the essential ingredients of
strong laws' and disingenuous lawsuits have often succeeded in hamstringing charter
schools with the same regulations that cripple the public schools."); Editorial, The Secret
War on Charters, N.Y. POST, May 2, 1999, at 54.
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genuine competitioni 6 By competing with government-run
schools, charter schools can force them to reform, but "only if
the conditions are right: if there are enough charter schools, if
diverse groups can create them, if they can get charters from
somebody other than the local monopoly, if they take significant
money away from the monopoly, and if they are free [from]
district bureaucracy. " 4 In most places, these conditions are not
met.48
In any event, charter schools could never be enough. We
believe that "real" school choice must include private, religious
schools. 9 Even if it were true that charter schools, magnet
schools, and public-school-only choice programs could supply
the competition necessary to inspire government schools and
union bureacracies to adopt "truly revolutionary
improvements," °  our constitutional and civil ideals, our
pluralistic traditions, and our professed commitment to religious
liberty would still require more.
Putting aside the question of whether a real choice program
would have to be universal,"' or could instead be limited to low-
income children 2 or children attending poorly performing
46. See HASSEL, supra note 44 ("Fifteen of the first 35 charter laws allow local school
boards to veto applications. Fifteen make charter schools part of their local school
districts, denying them legal independence. Only 17 of the laws permit full per-pupil
operating funding to follow the child from a district to a charter school; fewer than five
allow capital funding to follow the child. And many laws restrict the number of charter
schools that can open, the types of people and organizations that can propose charter
schools, or both."); VrrE rI, supra note 8, at 71-72.
47. Osborne, supra note 44, at 33.
48. See i&
49. On the importance, both from a practical and a theoretical standpoint, of
including religious schools in any school-choice program, see VITERmTI, supra note 8, at
82-86.
50. And they probably cannot. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN
AUTOPSY 1-3 (1993) (comparing reform of public education in the United States to
perestroika in the former Soviet Union).
51. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
52. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ohio 1999) ("The scholarships
are ninety percent (for students with family income below two hundred percent of the
maximum income level established by the superintendent) or seventy-five percent (for
students with family income at or above two hundred percent of that level) of the lesser
of the actual tuition charges or an amount to be established by the superintendent not to
exceed $2,500."); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1998) (noting that
under the original Milwaukee choice program, eligible students were required to come
from a family whose income was not more than 1.75 times the federal poverty level);
V1TERITrI, supra note 8, at 219-20; John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justre, FIRST
THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 15, 20.
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government schools, 3 we believe that a school-choice program is
legally permissible if it (1) makes public funds available to
parents to spend on their children's education (2) at any
school-government-run or private, religious or secular-that
meets certain baseline, religion-neutral criteria. A state might
say, for instance, "School districts in this state currently spend
$5,000 per public-school pupil. From now on $4,000 of that
$5,000 will belong to the child's parents and will follow the child
(at the parents' direction) to whatever school those parents
select, even a religious school, provided the school satisfies
certain education-related, religion-neutral eligibility criteria. '
As we discuss below, not only would such a proposal not violate
the First Amendment, the Constitution in fact probably requires
states with private school-choice programs to include religious
schools in parents' menu of options. To do otherwise would be
to discriminate against religious schools and parents who choose
them, which is just as unconstitutional as "establishing
religion.'
B. The United States Constitution and Religion
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."56 What does a constitutional provision
that appears merely to prohibit the federal government from
53. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834, 836 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (noting
that Ohio program was designed to "address an educational crisis in Cleveland's public
schools" and was therefore open to students living in the District); orida Begins Voucher
Plan for Education, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1999, at A15 ("Only children in schools deemed
failures by the state, based on student test scores, are eligible.").
54. See, e.g., Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 209 (participating schools in the original Cleveland
program not allowed to "discriminate on the basis of religion or teach hatred on the
basis of religion"); Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608 (noting that under original Milwaukee
plan, participating schools were required to "comply with the anti-discrimination
provisions imposed by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d and all health and safety laws or codes that
apply to Wisconsin public schools" and also "had to meet on an annual basis defined
performance criteria and had to submit to the State certain financial and performance
audits"); cf. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Deptartment of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 545 (Vt,
1999) (holding that, under Vermont's tuitioning system, private schools that receive
public money are required to comply with certain rules requiring, among other things,
"'that the school has the resources required to meet its stated objectives, including
financial capacity, faculty who are qualified by training and experience in the areas in
which they are assigned, and physical fadlities and special services that are in accordance
with any state or federal law or regulation'") (internal citation omitted).
55. See genera/ly, e.g., Volokh, supra note 35, at 365-73 (reviewing Free Exercise, Free
Speech, and Equal Protection Clause cases disallowing the government from
discriminating against religion).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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setting up an official church (and perhaps also from meddling
with the states' own official churches) 57 have to say about state
and local governments' decisions to provide their citizens with
tuition vouchers to private and religious schools?
There is little point here in trying to determine the meaning
or identify the grand unifying theory of the Religion Clause, or
to describe the history of its wild ride through the United States
Reports. The Clause might well have been intended to be little
more than a jurisdictional device-a way of clarifying that
religion, speech, and assembly were subjects that the states, and
not the United States, were competent to address-without any
substantive content or "deep theory" at all." Yet the search for
the "big idea" continues. Some contend, for example, that the
First Amendment requires "neutrality,"' °  or "non-
discrimination,"" toward religion. Others argue that the
Religion Clause lays down a strict rule of "separation" between
government and religion, or of "no aid" to religion.62 And, in the
Supreme Court, different Justices have in recent years found in
the Clause prohibitions against "endorsement "6 of religion and
the "coercion"64 of religious belief or expression.
57. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131,
1157 (1991) ("The establishment lause did more than prohibit Congress from
establishing a national church. Its mandate that Congress shall make no law 'respecting
an establishment of religion' also prohibited the national legislature from interfering
with, or trying to dis-establish, churches established by state and local governments.").
58. For a comprehensive account, see GERALD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987).
59. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 17-34 (1995); Steven D. Smith, The
Religion Clauses in Constitutional Scholarship, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1037-42 (1999).
60. E.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997); ef. Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the
Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality and Free Speech Valus-A Critical Analysis of
"Neutrality Theory" and "Charitable Choice," 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 243
(1999).
61. E.g., Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY
LJ. 43 (1997) (re-casting "neutrality" as "non-discrimination").
62. Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconcptions: No-Aid Separationism and the
Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285 (1999) (criticizing
"no-aid separationism").
63. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("IT]he endorsement test asks the right question about
governmental practices challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.. . .") (quoting
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-99 (1992).
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In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Hugo Black put the
gloss on the Establishment Clause that has probably, for better
or worse, most influenced the shape of the school-choice debate:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
"a wall of separation between Church and State.""
There is little doubt that Justice Black would have recoiled from
the prospect of public monies trickling their way to Catholic
schools through a choice program.6 Still, the question remains:
even using Black's terms, does the "wall of separation" between
"Church and State" mean that governments are constitutionally
disabled from harnessing the potential of religious schools as
one tool among many for promoting the common good?
Treat that as a rhetorical question. No doubt the debate over
the meaning and purpose of the Establishment Clause will keep
the law reviews in business for years to come. Although we are
inclined to think that the Constitution was not intended to
require discrimination against religion, religiously motivated
choices, religious institutions, or religious schools,"7 we do not
65. 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted). The historical account on which Justice
Black relied in applying the Establishment Clause to the question presented in
Everson-may public schoolbuses be used to transport children to parochial
schools?--has been widely criticized and likely reflectsJustice Black's own biases as much
as the Clause's true meaning. For a contrary account of the history of the First
Amendment Religion Clause, see Wallace v. Jaflfree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Hugo Black was a great justice. He also, unfortunately, harbored deep prejudices
against Catholics. SeeROGERK. NEwVMAN, HuGo BLACK 87,104,137 n.*, 521 (1994).
67. See Volokh, supra note 35, at 351 ("[Mly sense of the Framers' worldview is that
they did not think the government was required to discriminate against religion."); see
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need, for present purposes, to decide what, if anything, the
Establishment Clause "really" means. Instead, it is probably
enough, in this context, to apply what could be called the "no
way in hell" test. That is, is there any reason to think that the
First or Fourteenth Amendments were originally intended or
understood to mean, or should today be understood to mean,
that funds once in the possession of the government may not
later be spent by private citizens to educate their own children at
a religiously affiliated school? The "no way in hell" test yields a
fairly clear answer.
C. Three-Prong Tests and Late-Night Horror Films
In any event, whatever might be the "deep theory" of the
Establishment Clause, the constitutional test employed in aid-to-
religious-schools cases appears to be fairly well settled.'
a In Lemon
v. Kurtzman,6 the Supreme Court considered whether states
could reimburse private and religious schools for the cost of
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other secular educational
materials. After surveying the "cumulative criteria developed by
the Court over many years," and building on Justice Black's
opinion in Everson, the Court identified the three "prongs" of
what would come to be known as the Lemon test for alleged
Establishment Clause violations: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.""
also Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Art. I1, in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 131
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1973) ("Religion, morality, and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of
education shall forever be encouraged."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Establishment Clause does not license
government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it... as subversive 
of
American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities.").
68. See Esbeck, supra note 60, at 287 ("The Lemon test is the doctrinal formula most
often resorted to in the lower federal and state courts.").
69. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). As it happened, the programs at issue in Lemon
flunked the test's third prong- the Court decided that the programs 
were
unconstitutional because "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing 
state
surveillance [would] inevitably be required to ensure" that the teachers whose salaries
were subsidized did not "inculcate religion" to their students. Id. at 619. The 
Court
seemed especially troubled by the facts that many of the teachers who benefitted 
under
the programs were nuns and that Catholic schools were, after all, "'integral part[s] of the
religious mission of the Catholic Church'" and "'a powerful vehicle for transmitting 
the
Catholic faith to the next generation.'" Id. at 615-16 (citation omitted).
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The Lemon test has been applied haphazardly, to put it kindly,by the Supreme Court ever since the case was decided.71 Justice
Scalia has compared the test to a horror-movie ghoul that
repeatedly crawls back from the grave to terrify young children 72(a particularly apt image given the use of the test in JudgeOliver's decision striking down the Cleveland program). Still,
there is little question that, at least in the lower courts, Lemon's
"prongs" remain the doctrinal ordeal any state's real school-
choice program must endure, at least until the Supreme Court
tries its hand again.73
D. The School-Choice Constitutional Canon
Just as any aid-to-students-at-religious-schools cases will almost
certainly involve application of the "Lemon test," they will also
require, in the application of that test, the now-familiar judicial
march through the Supreme Court decisions7 that currently
comprise the school-choice constitutional canon.7
1. Everson v. Board ofEducatioOt
Everson involved a government program under which theparents of children attending Catholic schools---just like parents
of students attending non-religious schools----vere reimbursed
for their children's bus fares. Although Justice Black
constitutionalized Jefferson's vague and unhelpful "wall of
71. The Court's unpredictable invocations of the test have prompted justice Scalia to
complain that "[w]hen we wish to strike down a practice (the Lemon test] forbids, weinvoke it... [and] when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore itentirely. . . ." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399(1993) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment). The status of the Lemon test is less than
clear. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down nondenominationalhigh school graduation prayer without applying Lemon); Zobrest v. Catalina FoothillsSch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding government assistance to handicapped child ina Catholic school, without applying or even citing Lemon); cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.203 (1997) (modifying the test's "entanglement" prong and concluding that
entanglement is not a separate inquiry but is instead an "aspect" of the inquiry into aprogram's "effect"); Lamb's Chape 508 U.S. at 395 (applying Lemon test and holding thatpublic-school district could not deny church group access to public-school facilities); seealso Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon IsDead, 43 CASEW. REs. L. REV. 795 (1993).
72. See Lamb's Chape4 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)(comparing Lemon to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie").
73. SeeEsbeck, supra note 60, at 287.
74. We have provided here only the most general sketch of the relevant decisions.These cases are certainly not as straightforward as the following summaries suggest.75. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834, 844-60 (N.D. Ohio 1999);Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 611-17 (Wis. 1998).
76. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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separation" metaphor, 7 he also insisted that, while government
may not prefer religion, it also may not discriminate against
citizens "because of their faith, or lack of it," in the
administration of public-welfare programs and the disbursement
of public benefits. 8
The Everson Court concluded that the bus fares of parochial-
school students were paid by the State "as a part of a general
program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public
and other schools."' The Court conceded that "children are
helped to get to church schools" and that "there is even a
possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their
children's bus fares out of their own pockets when
transportation to a public school would have been paid for by
the State."' But the Court insisted that the same could be said
when policemen protect religious-school pupils from traffic
hazards, or when government provides religious schools with
sewer lines and fire protection." The Court concluded:
Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so
separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to
operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions, than it is to favor them.82
2. Board ofEducation v. Allen
A little more than twenty years later, the Court returned to the
religious-school-aid question in a case concerning New York's
policy of loaning state-approved textbooks in secular subjects to
all junior-high and high-school students-including students in
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id
81. See id.
82. I& at 18.
83. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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religious schools.8 Relying on Everson, the Court upheld the
program, emphasizing that (1) "no funds or books are furnished
to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and
children, not to schools"; and (2) "[o]nly secular books may
receive approval."8 The Court also noted that the law at
issue-ike the program in Everson-conferred, under a general
program, a benefit on all children, not just children attending
religious schools.8 6 Once again, the Court admitted that
"[p]erhaps free books make it more likely that some children
choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the
state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate
an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution. "7
3. Committee forPublic Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquiste
In Nyquist-generally treated by anti-voucher litigators as the
constitutional equivalent of a "smart bomb"8 -- New York set up
several financial-aid programs, including one that provided
partial tuition reimbursement for low-income parents of
students attending nonpublic schools.0 The Court concluded
that these programs, unlike those upheld in Everson and Allen,
violated the Establishment Clause because, in Lemon-speak, they
had the "impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian
activities of religious schools."' The aid permitted in Everson and
Allen "assist[ed] only the secular functions of sectarian schools,"
and conferred only an "indirect and incidental" benefit to the
schools' religious functions, but the tuition-reimbursement
programs at issue in Nyquist were thought to directly "subsidize
and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools."2
84. Allen is best understood against the backdrop of New York's longstanding "schoolwars," one wave of which was raging at the time of the decision. See generally DIANERAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 280-378 (describing the New York City SchoolBoard's attempts in the late 1960s to reorganize and decentralize the city's public
schdols).
85. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-45.
86. See id. at 243.
87. Id. at 244.
88. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
89. In the 1980s video game "Defender," a "smart bomb" could be deployed whendeath was imminent to destroy every nasty, threatening item on the screen.
90. See 413 U.S. at 761-69.
91. Id. at 794.
92. Id. at 775, 779-80.
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Furthermore, the Court held, this was true even though the
programs' benefits--tuition reimbursement and tax relief-went
directly to parents, not to schools: "[T]he effect of the aid [was]
unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic,
sectarian institutions. "s
The Court then qualified its decision in one of the more
important footnotes in the United States Reports,
4 noting that
"Allen and Everson differ from the present litigation in a second
important respect. In both cases the class of beneficiaries
included all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in
private schools."5 The Court took care to reserve the question
"whether the significantly religious character of [a] statute's
beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a case
involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships)
made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted,"96 such as the federal G.I. Bill, which paid for
education at both public and private colleges and universities.
4. Mueller v. Allen
97
Ten years later, in 1983, a Court markedly less wary of religion
approved a Minnesota law that conferred on taxpayers generally
a deduction for the costs of tuition, textbooks, and
transportation for dependent children at elementary and
secondary schools.98 Like Justice Black in Everson, then-Justice
93. Id. at 783.
94. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (When identifying
"fundamental" substantive-due-process rights, "[w]e refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(regarding "discrete and insular" minorities whose interests call for heightened judicial
scrutiny).
95. Nyquist 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. The benefits at issue in Nyquist remember, were
available only to parents who chose to send their children to nonpublic schools.
96. Id.
97. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
98. Id. We have omitted from this discussion several cases involving public assistance
to religious schools and their students, including Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971) (construction grants to religious colleges not unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975) (loans to religious schools of "instructional material" like
"maps, charts, and lab equipment" held unconstitutional because the aid was "massive"
and its effect was the "direct and substantial advancement of religious activity"); and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977) (guidance counseling and remedial-
education services to religious school students permitted to be provided off-site, but loan
of "instructional materials" directly to parents of religious-school students held
unconstitutional). These cases have had less explicit impact in recent school-choice
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Rehnquist relied on the deduction's availability to all parents,
whether their children attended public, private, or religious
schools.99 The fact that the Minnesota program "neutrally
provide[d] state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens"''
distinguished it from the programs invalidated in Nyquist.
Two points about Mueller are crucial. The Court emphasized
that any government assistance the deduction provided to
religious schools was channeled "through individual parents. ""'
Therefore, "under Minnesota's arrangement public funds
become available only as a result of numerous private choices of
individual parents of school-age children." 102 The Court continued,
"The historic purposes of the [Establishment] Clause simply do
not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit,
ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that
eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available
tax benefit at issue in this case."'03 Second, the aid in question-a
tax deduction--was available to all parents; it was "neutral"
toward religion. This neutrality was not undermined by the fact
that, as it happened, most of the tax deductions under the
program were taken by parents of children in religious schools.
The Court refused to transform Minnesota's neutral law into an
unconstitutional establishment of religion simply because many,
rather than a few, private citizens elected religious schools for
their children.104
cases. Also, their fate is far from certain. The Supreme Court might well overturn or limitthem in the currently pending case of Mitchell v. Helms, No. 98-1648. See Brief forPetitioners at 45 ("Meek and Wolman's prohibition on the provision of instructional
materials and equipment to students in religious schools... is predicated on aninterpretation of the Establishment Clause that has no grounding in the purposes of theFirst Amendment and was an unexplained departure from then-controllingprecedent."). Similarly, there is little point to discussing School District v. Bal4 473 U.S.373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), where the Court invalidatedgovernment programs that provided remedial-education services to special-needs
children in religious schools, given that these decisions were largely overruled in Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
99. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397.
100. Id. at 398-99.
101. Id. at 399.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 401 ("We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which
various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law.... [Tihe fact thatprivate persons fail in a particular year to claim the tax relief to which they are entitled-
under a facially neutral statute-should be of no importance in determining the
constitutionality of the statute permitting such relief."); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521U.S., 203, 229-30 (1997). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834,852 (N.D.
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5. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
05
In Witters, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by
Justice Marshall, built on Mueller and upheld government aid
under a program quite similar to the basic school-choice
model.106 Larry Witters was practically blind, yet was studying to
become a Christian minister at a private Christian college. He
applied for financial assistance with his education through a
Washington program for the disabled, but was rejected because
program officials, and later the Washington courts, decided that
providing Mr. Witters with the same assistance provided
generally to other disabled students would violate the First
Amendment.
The Court disagreed-again, unanimously. Echoing Justice
Rehnquist in Mueller, Justice Marshall0 7 wrote that the First
Amendment permitted Washington to treat Mr. Witters like any
other applicant, notwithstanding his dream of being a minister,
because "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's program that
ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result
of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid
recipients, " ] s and any "decision to support religious education is
made by the individual, not by the State."1° As it had in
Mueller,n ° the Court relied expressly on Nyquist's footnote thirty-
eight, emphasizing that the terms and criteria of the Washington
program itself were neutral respecting religion, and thus
benefits were "'made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the
institution benefitted.'""'
Ohio 1999) ("Consideration of the number and percentage of sectarian schools
participating in the Voucher Program is not forbidden by Muelr.").
105. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
106. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 615 (Wis. 1998).
107. How often does one get to mention Justice Marshall "echoing" Justice
Rehnquist?
108. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
109. Id. at 488.
110. Justice Marshall dissented in Mueller, and did not even mention the case in his
opinion for the Court in Witters. But five Justices, in concurring opinions, observed that,
given Mue//er, "state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance
to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the
Lemon test, because any aid to religion results from the private choices of individual
beneficiaries." Id. at 490-91 (Powell,J., concurring).
111. Id. at 487 (quoting Commission for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983).
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6. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District"2
The momentum was building. In 1993, relying heavily on
Mueller and Witters, the Court upheld the use of federal-program
funds, disbursed under a general, neutral program designed to
assist children with disabilities, to pay for a sign-language
interpreter in an Arizona Catholic school. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the author of the opinion in Mueller, returned in
Zobrest to the earlier case's key points. He stated, "By according
parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute
ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a
sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual
parents."". The Chief Justice then noted, "The service at issue in
this case is part of a general government program that
distributes benefits neutrally to any [qualified] child... without
regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature' of the school the child attends."114
7. Agostini v. Felto "
Although decisions like Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest suggested
that the Court was moving from suspicion of religion toward
neutrality, earlier precedents continued to block efforts at
education reform. In 1985, for instance, the Court had ruled in
Aguilar v. Felton that the First Amendment did not permit public-
school teachers to provide federally funded remedial-education
services "on site" in parochial schools."' Apparently, these
teachers-though public employees---wvere not to be trusted(especially given the temptations posed by the presence of
crucifixes in the classroom) with the task of sticking to secular
matters. The Court believed that the monitoring necessary to
keep the teachers in line would itself create unconstitutional
entanglement" between government and religion."7 But the
children still needed help, and many jurisdictions had settled on
the expensive and cumbersome solution of providing special-
education services to religious-school students in "mobile
112. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
113. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
116. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
117. Id. at 412.
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instructional units," a euphemism for "vans converted into
classrooms."118
Twelve years later, in Agostini, the Court finally said that
enough was enough. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
repudiated the notion that public-employees' presence in a
religious-school classroom "inevitably results in the
impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or
constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion" nm and rejected the rule that "all government aid that
directly aids the educational function of religious schools is
invalid."'12 The Court was not distracted by the question of
whether the special-education services constituted "direct" or
"indirect" aid. Instead, it emphasized that the federal-program
benefits (1) were disbursed according to neutral criteria,
without regard to religion, and (2) reached religious institutions
as a "result of the private decision of individual parents [and]
could not be attributed to state decisionmaking.",
2 1
The seven cases discussed above could reasonably be said to
be the federal constitutional-law "canon" for school-choice
questions.'2 On the one hand are the basic principles of
neutrality and independent choice, which are rooted in Everson
and Allen and have been translated and reaffirmed in the more
recent Mueller-Witters-Zobrest-Agostini line of cases.ls On the other
hand is Nyquist, with its insistence that public funding of
individuals' educational choices can, in some cases, have the
118. Agostin4 521 U.S. at 213.
119. Id. at 223.
120. Id. at 225.
121. Id. at 226 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993))
(emphasis in Agostini). It will be interesting to see whether the Court applies Agostinis
modified Lemon test in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, No. 99-62, or Mitchell v.
Helms, No. 98-1648.
122. Many states' constitutions contain provisions that speak to the inclusion of
religious schools in school-choice programs. See infra notes 184-192.
123. The Court's 1995 decision in Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995), likewise emphasized that "the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not
offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies,
extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones,
are broad and diverse." Id. at 839; cf. Board of Regents v. Southworth, No. 98-1189, 2000
WL 293217, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2000) (holding that First Amendment permits a public
university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate
extracurricular student speech, so long as allocation of the funds to student groups is
done on a viewpoint-neutral basis).
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"effect" of "advancing religion."124 The Court hedged this
position, though, when it stated that it "need not decide whether
the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries
might differentiate the present cases from a case involving some
form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available
generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." '25 The
question is, are today's choice programs such a "form of public
assistance"?
E. Examples from the Heartland
1.Jackson v. Benson12
6
Two recent decisions involving the nation's two leading
school-choice experiments illustrate nicely the basic structure of
the standard Establishment Clause argument and the "battle of
the precedents" just mentioned. First, in the summer of 1998,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jackson v. Benson rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to the pioneering Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program'2 (which, as amended, included
religious schools) in what was widely viewed as a bell-weather
opinion for the constitutional future of school choice. The
Court concluded that, in Lemon terms, the program "does not
violate the Establishment Clause because it has a secular
purpose, it will not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, and it will not lead to excessive entanglement between
the state and participating sectarian private schools."
The Court quickly and easily established that the Milwaukee
choice program had a "secular purpose."m  Turning to the
124. 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973).
125. Id.
126. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
127. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1999), amended by 1995 Wis. Acr 27, §§ 4002-4009 (1999).
For details on the program, see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608-10.
128. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 611.
129. Id. at 612. This first part of the Lemon test is, generally speaking, easy to satisfy.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("The Court has invalidated
legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but
only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations."); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394(1983) ("Little time need be spent on the question" of whether a tax deduction scheme
for parents who sent their children to nonpublic schools served a secular purpose
because "governmental assistance programs [to nonpublic schools] have consistently
survived this inquiry even when they have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon
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question of the program's "effects" and whether it "either
advances or inhibits religion, ""' the Wisconsin Justices stated
that:
Although the lines with which the Court has sketched the
broad contours of this inquiry [into a statute's effects] are fine
and not absolutely straight, the Court's decisions generally can
be distilled to establish an underlying theory based on
neutrality and indirection: state programs that are wholly
neutral in offering educational assistance directly to citizens in
a class defined without reference to religion do not have the
primary effect of advancing religion.
1 3 1
To illustrate the importance of these two principles, the
Wisconsin Court then reviewed the canonical cases summarized
abovel32 and a few others. It gleaned from these cases a general
rule:
[S] tate educational assistance programs do not have the
primary effect of advancing religion if those programs provide
public aid to both sectarian and nonsectarian institutions (1)
on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor
disfavor religion; and (2) only as a result of numerous private
choices of the individual parents of school-age children.T 4
The Court concluded that the Milwaukee program was
"precisely such a program."3
Applying the canon's neutrality and indirection principles,
the Wisconsin Court observed that eligibility for benefits under
the Milwaukee choice program was determined on the basis of
criteria having nothing to do with religion. 6 That is, Wisconsin
had not said, "all those children attending Catholic schools get a
voucher," or "all children who believe in God will receive tuition
assistance," but had instead said, "al poor children who live in
framework"); ef. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down Louisiana law
that required creationism to be discussed with evolution in public schools because the
law lacked a legitimate secular purpose).
130. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612.
131. Id at 613.
132. See id. at 613-17.
133. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).




Texas Review of Law &" Politics
Milwaukee get a choice."137 Similarly, unlike the situation in
Nyquist, participating schools were identified not on the basis of
religion--"al schools that are Bible-believing may participate in
the voucher program"-but could be religious or non-
religious.s The program, therefore, "satisfie [d] the principle of
neutrality required by the Establishment Clause."'"
The program also met the requirement of intervening,
independent private choice-the "indirection" requirement-
because "aid flows to sectarian schools only as a result of
numerous private choices of the individual parents of school-age
children."'" Thus the Milwaukee program "places on equal
footing options of public and private school choice, and vests
power in the hands of parents to choose where to direct the
funds allocated for their children's benefit."4 Finally, the Court
concluded that the Milwaukee program did not create "excessive
governmental entanglement" with religion, through monitoring
requirements or otherwise.'"
2. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman'"
The United States Supreme Court declined to review the
Jackson decision. That decision stands as a clear, common-sense
resolution of the Establishment Clause question presented by
authentic school-choice programs." Jackson can be contrasted
with the recent decision in Ohio, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, in
which Judge Solomon Oliver held that the Cleveland school-
choice program violated the Establishment Clause,
notwithstanding the contrary decision that same year by the
137. Id. at 618 ("A student qualifies for benefits under the [program] not because he
or she is a Catholic, ajew, a Moslem, or an atheist; it is because he or she is from a poor
family and is a student in the embattled Milwaukee Public Schools.").
138. See id.; cf. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
782 n.38 (1973).
139. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618.
140. Id. at 618. The Wisconsin Court was not distracted by the fact that the "State
sends the checks directly to the participating private school and the parents must
restrictively endorse the checks to the private schools." Id. ("[T]he importance of our
inquiry here is not to ascertain the path upon which public funds travel under the
amended program, but rather to determine who ultimately chooses that path.").
141. Id. at 619.
142. Id.
143. 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999). The decision is now on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
144. The Supreme Courts of Ohio and Arizona employed analyses similar to the
Wisconsin Court's in recent Establishment Clause decisions. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972
P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
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Supreme Court of Ohio.'4 The Ohio Supreme Court held, after
reviewing the "canon" in detail,'4 that Cleveland's school-
voucher program satisfied the Lemon test and therefore did not
violate the Establishment Clause.'47 The court rejected the idea
that Nyquist still creates a "bright-line" rule against government
aid that "directly aids the educational function of religious
schools." 48 Instead, it emphasized, citing Witters, Mueller, and
Zobrest, that the Cleveland program was "general," that "its
benefits are available irrespective of the type of alternative
school the eligible students attend," and that "funds cannot
reach a sectarian school unless the parents of a student decide,
independently of the government, to send their child to that
sectarian school."149
Six months later Judge Oliver, in an explosion of judicial
chutzpah, rejected this reasoning, striking down a reenacted
Cleveland choice program that was in all relevant respects
identical to the one the Ohio Supreme Court had said complied
with the Establishment Clause.15 Judge Oliver observed that the
Supreme Court "has generally held that a government cannot
provide scholarship assistance to students which supports
religious instruction or indoctrination, [Nyquist]," but has also
"approved of scholarship assistance where the aid to students is
provided as part of a program made generally available without
regard to the public-nonpublic or sectarian-nonsectarian nature
of the schools to be benefitted." 5' Generally available aid is
allowed because in "such circumstances, aid ultimately supports
the educational program of a religious institution only as the
result of the private choice of the aid recipient. Consequently,
there is no religious indoctrination attributable to the
government." 52 True enough.
Despite concluding that the Cleveland program has a "secular
purpose,"5 ' the district court likened the Cleveland program to
145. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d 203. Like the program upheld in Milwaukee, the
Cleveland school-choice program does not discriminate against religious schools.
146. See id. at 207-10.
147. See id. at 211. The Court did hold, though, that the program violated certain
provisions of the Ohio Constitution, having nothing to do with religion. See id. at 213.
148. Id. at 208 (quotingAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997)).
149. Id. at 209.
150. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
151. Id. at 843-44.
152. Id.
153. Id at 847.
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the program considered in Nyquist by observing that "while both
public and private schools are eligible, only private schools have
chosen to participate in the Program, and the vast majority of
them are parochial." " ' The court also emphasized that, as in
Nyquist, there "'"has been no endeavor to guarantee the
separation between secular and religious educational functions
and to ensure the State financial aid supports only the
former."'"*' These two facts, Judge Oliver concluded, "make
[the Cleveland program] indistinguishable for Establishment
Clause purposes from the tuition reimbursement program in
Nyquist" and, in his view, "[i]t can fairly be said that because the
Program does not make aid available generally without regard to
the nature of institution benefitted, the Voucher Program
results in government-sponsored indoctrination."' 5 The district
court thus found the Program invalid notwithstanding its facial
neutrality and the fact that parents, not the government, decide
whether once-public funds will be used to pay religious-school
tuition.
After finding "government-sponsored indoctrination" in a
program that merely provides assistance to parents who wish to
remove their children from troubled public schools, the district
court's precedent-narrowing march through Mueller, Witters,
Zobrest, and Agostini was little more than a formality. Mueller was
distinguished on the ground that parents in Muellerwho enjoyed
the tax deduction had a genuine, "significant" choice between
religious and non-religious schools.57 In Cleveland, though,
given the failure of more private non-religious schools and
public schools to participate in the program, the parents' choice
to attend religious schools was somehow suspect, or less
"independent." ss The court disregarded Witters for similar
reasons. In Witters, the choice to use program funds to attend
154. Id.
155. Id. at 847-48 (quoting Commission for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971))).
156. Id. at 849. The court also found it significant that, under the Cleveland program,
"[e]ven though parents must endorse their checks to the schools, the aid is given directly
to participating schools." Id.
157. Id. at851.
158. Id. at 850-54. The district court relied on the number and percentage of
religious schools participating in the program as a basis for invalidating the program,
notvithstanding the fact that the Mueller Court "indicated that it would not base the
constitutionality of a program on the consideration of yearly statistical evidence
reflecting the extent to which nonsectarian schools might benefit from the tax
deduction." Id. at 851-52.
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religious schools was "genuine" ("as a practical matter, [Mr.
Witters] had a great many more nonreligious options"'), while
"students in the Voucher Program have no meaningful choice
between attending sectarian schools and nonsectarian
schools."16° The same was true of Zobrest. Not only did that case
involve real (as opposed to illusory) parental choice, but the
court also insisted that the Cleveland Program, unlike the
presence of a sign-language interpreter in religion classes,
"result[s] in indoctrination."161 And finally, the court avoided
Agostini on the ground that the federal program at issue there
did not send funds into the "coffers" of religious schools162 and
the government benefits "would have no effect on a student's
choice of what school to attend because the services could be
utilized at any school."" . Unlike the Cleveland Program, the
federal program at issue in Agostini involved independent
parental choice, created no "incentives" to attend religious
schools, and did not result in religious "indoctrination."'6
In the end, the Cleveland Program ran afoul of the two
principles Judge Oliver discerned in Nyquist. It "result[ed] in
government-sponsored indoctrination" because the aid did not
"flow[] to religious schools as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of beneficiaries. "16 And it "create[d]
incentives for students to attend religious schools."'6
Judge Oliver, unlike the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts,
misunderstood the significance of private choice in the relevant
cases. It cannot be true that the constitutionality of a program,
159. Id. at 855.
160. I at 855-56 ("Unlike in Witters, nearly all state aid under the Voucher Program
will flow to religious institutions. It cannot be said that this aid flows to those institutions
as a result of the choice of the Program beneficiaries since nearly all the schools
participating are religious.").
161. Id. at 857.
162. Why is it that Catholic schools are thought by courts to have "coffers," as
opposed to, say, "bank accounts"?
163. 1& at 859. This argument seems wrong. Religious schools are made at least
marginally more desirable to parents if they know that their learning-disabled children
will not lose valuable and helpful government assistance.
164. Id at 858-59. The district court also explained why the Supreme Court's
Rosenberger decision did not help the Cleveland Program. See id. at 860.
165. Id. at 864. The court added, "[b]y the very nature of the Program, parents do
not have a genuine choice between sending their children to sectarian or nonsectarian
schools because sectarian schools overwhelmingly predominate." Id. at 863-64. We note
here, perhaps belatedly, the increasing criticism of the Court's long-time use of the term
"sectarian" to refer to Catholic schools. See generally, eg., Richard A. Baer, The Supreme
Court's Discaiminatory Use of the Term 'Sectarian,'6J.L. & POL. 449 (1990).
166. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834,864 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
332 Texas Review of Law &Politics Vol. 4
which everyone admits has the valid governmental purpose of
improving poor children's educational opportunities, hinges on
whether a reviewing judge believes that parents' choices to send
their children to religious schools, as opposed to non-religious
alternative schools, display the requisite indicia of genuineness.
The crucial point, as the Wisconsin Court recognized, is that
parents, not government, make the decision to channel
program funds to religious schools. Given an intervening private
choice-whether or not a court views the choice as sufficiently
"genuine" to be worthy of constitutional respect-it should not
matter whether the religious schools a parent chooses engage in
something called "indoctrination." It should not matter because
parents, not the government, are choosing that "indoctrination."
Nor should the fact that public schools have, thus far, failed to
take up the state on its offer to help poor children affect the
analysis. The public schools' decisions not to participate should,
perhaps, be criticized, just as the religious schools' decisions
should be praised. But these decisions are not relevant to the
constitutional question.
Imagine that several poorly run government schools from
neighboring districts and a dozen or so lousy non-religious
private schools had chosen to participate in the Cleveland
Program. Judge Oliver would no longer be able to use the bare
number of religious schools to say that the parents' choices were
less than genuine. Would he have then argued that the choices
were insufficiently independent because the only alternatives to
religious schools were schools that were no better, or perhaps
even worse, than the government schools? What other factors, in
Judge Oliver's view, may a court consider as it unpacks the
independence of parents' choices? Should Catholic parents'
choices to select Catholic schools, because they are religiously
motivated, be considered less-than-genuine? Of course not.
The constitutionality of a choice program should not depend
on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time,
most private schools are run by religious organizations. That
education has long been a special mission of religious groups is
not legally relevant. For Establishment Clause purposes, the
question is whether the government is favoring religion, not
whether parents are choosing it. The Ohio Legislature is not
responsible for the fact that most schools that have chosen to
participate in the choice program are religious; the legislature
No. 2 School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice 333
decided, using non-religious criteria, to increase parents'
options. The relative attractiveness of parents' non-religious
options should not distort the constitutional analysis.
Several other courts, in addition to those in Wisconsin and
Ohio, have weighed in recently on the Establishment Clause
questions presented in the school-reform debate. The Arizona
Supreme Court, relying heavily on Mueller, upheld a state tax
credit of up to $500 for donations to "school tuition
organizations" (some of which were created for religious
schools) .167 Like the federal district court in Ohio, however, both
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the
Supreme Court of Maine held in 1999 that the Establishment
Clause required Maine to exclude religious schools from its
school-choice-like "tuitioning program"16e The Supreme Court
of Vermont also held that Vermont not only could, but was
required to, exclude religious schools from its similar
"tuitioning" program, but this requirement was justified on state,
rather than federal, constitutional grounds.
69 Although the
Supreme Court declined review in each of these cases, Judge
Oliver's decision in Zelman in the Cleveland case is currently on
appeal before the Sixth Circuit and, if the decision were
affirmed, would likely be reviewed by the Court, requiring yet
another battle between Nyquist and the Muellerlines of cases.
F. The Bottom Line: Private Citizens'Preferences for Religious Schools,
and Equal Treatment ly Government of Religious Schools, Do Not
"Establish" Religion
The First Amendment limits government conduct; it has
nothing to say about private action (other than to suggest that
private assembly, speech, and worship are worth protecting by
167. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); see generally Ralph D.
Mawdsley, State Tax Credits for Private Education." The Arizona Experience in Kotterman v.
Killian, 136 EDuC. L. RE'. 647 (1999) (describing Arizona tax-credit plan and Kotterman
decision in detail). As they did in Ohio, school-choice opponents in Arizona have opted
to try their luck again, this time in federal district court. See Winn et aL v. Killian, No. CIV
00-0287 (D. Ariz. filed Feb. 15, 2000) (complaint on file with author).
168. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 329 (1999);
Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 364
(1999).
169. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 626 (1999). Similarly, a Florida trial court ruled that Florida's
choice program violated that State's constitution. SeeWilgoren, supra note 22.
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limiting government)o170 Constitutionality depends on the actor,
not the action:
The very same conduct can be either constitutionally
protected or constitutionally forbidden, depending on
whether those who engage in it are acting in their 'private' or
their 'public' capacities. If a group of people get together and
form a church, that is the free exercise of religion. If the
government forms a church, that is an establishment of
religion. One is protected; one is forbidden.171
Americans are permitted (in fact, they are constitutionally
entided)'72 to teach their children that Catholicism is true; the
government, however, is not permitted an opinion on whether
Catholicism is true. 3 On which side of the line is school choice?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court got it right in Jackson: school-
choice programs that include religious schools are constitutional
because they satisfy the Supreme Court's two basic requirements
of "neutrality" and "indirection."'74 That is, the "beneficiaries" of
such programs are not identified by the government on the basis
of religion. 175 Even if religious schools benefit from school
170. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."). See generally, e.g., JOHNGARVE, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996) (arguing that religious freedom is protected
because religion is a good thing).
171. Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion
in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REv. 163, 184.
172. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that, while the statehas the power to reasonably regulate schools, it cannot force parents to send their
children to public schools rather than private). But see JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUSSCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998) (suggesting that, in some cases, teaching
"repressive" forms of religious belief to children should be regarded as harmful and
calling for extensive regulation of religious schools' curricula).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-89 (1944) (stating thatgovernment lacks power to judge truth of religious beliefs); Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) ("The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect.").
174. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 613 (Wis. 1998).
175. See id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)) (rejecting challenge toprogram that provided funds to religious and secular institutions for sex-education and
other programs); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)(upholding state statute that provided funds to qualifying colleges and
universities-religious and secular-on the basis of neutral criteria); Hunt v. McNair,413 U.S. 734 (1973) (rejecting attack on state law that provided certain benefits to all in-
state institutions of higher education, regardless of religious affiliation); Tilton V.Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding federal law that provided grants to "all
colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religiousbody"); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding government provision
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choice, they benefit indirectly. Only if an individual citizen
decides to send his child to a religious school does the school
benefit. 
1 6
There are two, common-sense constitutional explanations for
these requirements: private decisions to attend religious schools
are not government decisions, and equal treatment of religious
schools by government is not "establishment" of religion.
177 First,
when we decide to send our children to Catholic schools, no
one would suggest that in doing so we would unconstitutionally
"establish" Catholicism. How could we? Only the government
can "establish" religion. What is more, our decision would not
"establish" religion even if we were both government employees
who received all our income from the government, if we paid
the tuition out of government benefits received under A.F.D.C.
or the Social Security program, or if our decision were made
possible by the government's generous decision to subsidize our
lifestyle decisions through the home-mortgage deduction.
178 The
same is true with an education voucher. It is unconstitutional for
the government to "establish" religion, but it is not
unconstitutional for the government to give money to citizens,
even if those citizens turn around and give the money to
churches, as long as the government does not use religion to
decide whom it will benefit. The decision favoring religion is
private, and the government's role is entirely neutral.
Second, when the government allows freedom of educational
choice, when it refuses to discriminate against religious schools
or to single out religion, religious expression, and religious
belief for special disadvantage, 1'7 9  it is respecting, not
of secular textbooks for use in both public and private schools); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (permitting state to provide busing services to both public and
private school children on an equal basis).
176. See Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995); Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
177. SeeVolokh, supra note 35.
178. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (comparing the use of
government funds in Witters to study for the ministry to "a State's issuing a paycheck to
one of its employees, knowing that the employee would donate part or all of the check to
a religious institution"); CWitters, 474 U.S. at 486-487.
179. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The government
may not... impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.");
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[G]overnment
may not use religion as a basis for classification for the imposition of duties, penalties,
privileges or benefits.").
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undermining, First Amendment commands.8 Even Lemon states
that the government may neither advance nor inhibit religion. s'
The government and its programs must be disinterested, not
hostile or suspicious, 182 when it comes to the religiously inspired
conduct and choices of its citizens.' School-choice programs
like those enacted in Wisconsin and Ohio satisfy this
requirement;Judge Oliver's opinion, we believe, does not.
G. Two More Wrinkles: State Constitutions and Regulatory Strings
The United States Constitution permits states to enact "real"
school-choice programs. It also requires states that decide to
experiment with educational choice to treat religious schools no
worse than they treat private non-religious schools."" But at least
180. Many courts and commentators have recognized that not only does the FirstAmendment's Establishment Clause not require discrimination against religious
expression and institutions, it forbids it, as do the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
of the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Seegeneraly, e.g., P'aulsen, supra note 35; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and theConstitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Litigation, 61 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 311 (1986); Volokh, supra note 35, at 365-373; see also, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S.819 (declaring that state university that funded student activities generally could not
single out religious newspaper for denial of funds); Lamb's Chapel v. Center MorichesUnion Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (following Widmar in elementary-school
context); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that if college opens
classrooms to secular meetings it must open them to religious meetings); KDM ex. rel.WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J.,dissenting) (arguing that it was unconstitutional to refuse to provide a disabled student,
who attended a parochial school, with a "vision specialist" to which he was entitled undera federal program); Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 155-57 & n.1 (4thCir. 1998) (excluding religious schools from a general education-funding programpresumptively violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses); Peter v. Wedl, 155F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998) (excluding religious schools from general federal program
"discriminated against children who attended private religious schools" and suchdiscrimination violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, as well as the EqualProtection Clause); Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 977-79 (6th Cir. 1995) (excluding
religious day-care centers from general program that permits child-care providers to usegovernment housing on military bases is discrimination that violates the Free ExerciseClause). But see, e.g., Stout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999); Bagley v. RaymondSch. Dep't, 782 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of
Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
181. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). For a detailed list of other Supreme Court decisions to
the same effect, see Volokh, supra note 35, at 367-368 n.55.
182. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religion, than it is to favor them."); Volokh, supra note35, at 369-370 nn. 57, 58 (citing cases where the Court has condemned hostility toward
religion).
183. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,532 (1993) ("[T]he protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issuediscriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conductbecause it is undertaken for religious reasons.").
184. See id.
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two more obstacles stand in the way of school choice. First, even
if the federal Constitution's broadly worded Establishment
Clause permits choice, many states' constitutions contain
provisions that were designed specifically to prevent public
money from ever finding its way to religious-particularly
Catholic--schools."u And second, even were there no state or
federal legal obstacles to including religious schools in choice
experiments, there are many who believe that the regulatory
strings which inevitably follow government financial assistance
would require religious schools to compromise, dilute, or
abandon their vital and distinctive religious missions. To these
critics, the potential benefits to poor children of school choice
are not worth the risk to religious schools."
6
1. State-Constitution Problems
In the mid-nineteenth century, there was, in fact, a dominant
religion-a "de facto Protestant Establishment,"-among
America's policymaking elites. 87 From Horace Mann's first
school in 1837, which he hoped would employ "true religion" to
save the souls of superstitious foreigners and turn them into
good republican citizens, to the first compulsory-attendance laws
enacted in Massachusetts in 1852, the roots of today's
government education monopoly are firmly planted in the
culture and ideology of nineteenth-century mainline American
Protestantism.'m The underbelly of Mann's earnest Christian
republicanism was the anti-Catholicism of the "Know Nothings,"
the fire-breathing rhetoric of Reverend Lyman Beecher, who in
1834 goaded a Boston mob to burn down a Catholic convent,
and Massachusetts' almost comical "Nunnery Investigation
Committee."'
89
Anti-Catholic leaders were incensed when Catholics
responded to the increasing use of compulsory-attendance laws
and "non-sectarian" (i.e., Protestant) religious instruction with
185. SeeVITERRIT, supra note 8, at 17-18; TobyJ. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117 (2000).
186. Our colleague Charles Rice has made this argument. See CHARLEs RIcE, THE
WINNING SIDE (1999).
187. MARKDEWOLFE HOWE, TmE GARDEN AND THEWILDERNESS 31 (1965).
188. See generally VTERrTm, supra note 8, at 145-79.
189. See e.g., RAY A. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860 (1938);John
T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination,
1928-1960,j. AM. HIS*oRJune 1997, at 97.
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their own parish-based schools, and they began to demand
public money for these schools on a basis comparable to the
"common" schools. Enter Representative James G. Blamne of
Maine, who "fully understood the wide political appeal of
the... anti-Catholic rhetoric that accompanied [President
Grant's] agenda and intended to take full advantage of it."''* He
introduced a constitutional amendment designed to fix a
"defect" in the United States Constitution, namely, the lack of a
prohibition on aid to religious schools.11 Blaine's effort to
change the federal constitution failed, barely, but he left an
important political legacy:
[Blaine's] name would live in perpetuity as a symbol of theirony and hypocrisy that characterized much future debate
over aid to religious schools: employing constitutional
language, invoking patriotic images, appealing to claims of
individual rights. All these ploys would serve to disguise the
real business that was at hand: undermining the viability of
schools run by religious minorities to prop up and perpetuate
a publicly supported monopoly of government-run schools. 92
Though Blaire failed to amend the Constitution, his efforts
bore fruit elsewhere. Republicans in Congress used their
majority status to force Blaine-type constitutional provisions on
new states. Like-minded legislators in other states amended their
own constitutions. By 1890, twenty-nine states had "baby Blaine"
amendments in their constitutions9 3 Consequently, even after
the Supreme Court confirms, as it surely will, that the
Establishment Clause permits non-discriminatory school choice,
reformers Will then confront, and indeed have already
confronted in several states,194 the Know-Nothing policies that
are today embedded in many state constitutions.""
190. VrrERrrrs, supra note 8, at 152.
191. Id. (quotingJames G. Blaine, Letter, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1875, at 2).
192. VrrERri, supra note 8, at 153.
193. See id. at 154. As recently at 1970, Michigan passed a referendum that forbadegiving vouchers or tax benefits to anyone who attends a private or parochial school. See
id. at 169.
194. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v.Department of Ed., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.1998); Heytens, supra note 185.
195. See generallyJoseph Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, andState ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PO'Y 657 (1998). Some have suggested thatthe historical facts surrounding the enactment of many of the states' "baby Blaine
amendments"--in particular, the apparent animus toward Catholics that inspired these
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2. Regulation of Private Schools
What about the "strings"? The concern that school-choice
programs might require religious schools to water down their
religious character, or subject these schools to increased
government control, has caused many religious-freedom
advocates to oppose vouchers."6 "Sure they're constitutional,"
the argument goes, "but they are not worth the cost." After all,
many believe that religious colleges and universities have
compromised their religious missions in order to attract and
retain federal funding!"7 Similar concerns have been voiced
concerning agencies that provide "faith-based" social
services-such as drug-treatment programs, crisis-pregnancy
counseling, and the like.' These concerns are not unfounded.
Many voucher opponents-and some who support vouchers but
also welcome increased regulation of religious schools--have
made it clear that they intend to make sure that any religious
schools that receive public funds are subjected to increased
oversight.'
enactments-could provide the basis for an argument that the amendments themselves
violate the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the Culture
Wars, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 105, 109 (1998) ("What is the difference between a state
Blaine amendment and the Colorado amendment rejected in Romer [v. Evans]?"). There
is litigation currently pending that challenges the Massachusetts provisions on these
grounds. See Boyette v. Galvin (No. 98-CV-10377) (D. Mass. filed Mar. 3, 1998)
(complaint on file with author) (challenging Massachusetts' 1854 "Anti-Aid"
Amendment (a precursor to the Blaine Amendment(s))); Editorial, Erasing Historic Error,
BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 7, 1998, at 12. The Massachusetts lawsuit challenges Amendment
Article 18, as Amended by Amendment Articles 46 and 103 of the Massachusetts
Constitution, and also parts of Article 48, as amended by Amendment Articles 81 and
108. While the suit goes forward, the parents and others are gathering signatures in an
attempt to modify the 1854 amendment through initiative.
196. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13
NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 375, 395-96 (1999) ("[S]ectarian schools which
accept government funding may well be required to reduce or eliminate discrimination
based on faith commitments in selecting students, and perhaps in selecting faculty as
well."); see also Eugene Volokh, Equa Treatment Is Not Establishment 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 341, 363-65 (1999) (discussing the "argument that school choice is
unconstitutional because it might hurt religious schools by bringing government
oversight and regulation and thus destroying religious schools' independence").
197. See, e.g.,JAMES T. BURTCHAELL, The DYING OF THE I.GHT (1998).
198. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with
Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997) ("For faith-based providers to
retain their religious character, programs of aid must be written to specially exempt
them from regulatory burdens that would frustrate or compromise their religious
character. Not only is this essential to attracting their participation, but it is in the
government's interest for these providers to retain the spiritual character so central to
their success in rehabilitating the poor and needy.").
199. SeeJAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 147 (1998).
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We agree that school choice might not be worth the good it
promises if the price of reform were the loss of distinctively
religious schools, or if religious schools were either required or
tempted by vouchers to homogenize and to become religious
only in an institutional-affiliation sense." Then again, the
current system already places significant pressures on religious
parents, who cannot afford to do otherwise, to compromise their
beliefs by reluctantly sending their children to government
schools that they perceive as increasingly hostile to traditional
religion."' Perhaps the better argument is that any secularizing
strings would themselves be unconstitutional if they required
religious schools to compromise their religious mission as a
condition of participating in an otherwise neutral school-choice
program-that is, as a condition of avoiding anti-religious
discrimination. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the
government may not attach "unconstitutional conditions" to
protected conduct, and it has made equally plain the rule that
the government may not single out religious institutions for
special disadvantage as a condition of participating on an equal
basis in neutral government-benefit programs. 2
Still, the concerns about "strings" are reasonable. Distinctively
religious institutions are vital to a healthy civil society. These
institutions can play that role only if they are independent of
government control. Religious institutions "are the giant rocks
on which civil society rests."0 3 No one should treat lightly any
threats to that foundation. We are cautiously optimistic that
sound constitutional interpretation will yield clear re-
affnmations of the rule that religious schools are not required to
purchase equal treatment by abandoning religion. To be sure,
200. It is not necessarily true, of course, that voucher programs will require increased
regulatory strings as the "price of admission" (unless they are forced to do so throughlitigation). In Milwaukee, for instance, the program did not permit participating schools
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and it required schools topermit voucher students to "opt out" of religious activities, but it did not forbid religion-based admissions by the schools. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607-09 (Wis.1998). The "no racial discrimination" requirement should not be problematic for any
religious school. The "opt out" requirement, however, might be.
201. See Volokh, supra note 35, at 364-65.
202. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that Tennessee
constitutional provision barring "ministers of the Gospel or priests of any denomination
whatever" from serving as delegates to state constitutional convention violated Free
Exercise Clause). See generally Paulsen, supra note 35 (arguing that excluding religiousinstitutions and believers from otherwise generally available public-benefit programs is
unconstitutional).
203. VIRr , supra note 8, at 208.
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the government will quite reasonably assert an inteiest in
making sure that education funds are being spent to educate, °
and that the public good is being well-served through sound
performance and achievement in religious schools. But this
interest should not extend-and may not extend-to overriding
the religious mission and teaching of religious schools.
Real school choice is constitutional. States and districts may,
consistent with the First Amendment, experiment with choice in
education, but should not permit those experiments to diminish
the rich diversity our religious schools offer. What is more, not
only is it permissible to enact school-choice programs in order to
create hope and opportunity in poor neighborhoods, encourage
improvements in public schools through competition, and
empower parents by respecting their capacities to act in their
children's best interests, but it is also the right thing to do.
M11. SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIALJUSTICE
Although school choice is often framed as a "conservative"
issue-despite the refreshingly strange bedfellows that make up
the pro-choice coalition-many are coming to see that school
choice is as much a matter of simple, social justice as a rallying
cry for economic libertarians or social conservatives.2Y5 In fact, as
Joseph Viteritti argues convincingly in his recent book, it is
school choice, not monopoly, that holds out the greatest
promise for achieving some of our most cherished social-justice
goals: racial integration, equal educational opportunity, and
religious freedom.Y
A. The Failure of Government-Run Schools
America's public schools are failing the children who need
them the most--children caught in a tragic cycle of poverty,
dependency, and despair. For these children, a quality
education represents their best, perhaps only, hope for a better
204. See, e.g., Paul West, Bush Unveils School Plan, BALT. SUN., Mar. 29, 2000, at 1A
("Bush has called for the overhaul of federal aid to schools that serve poor students, so-
called Title I schools. He would provide vouchers to parents of children at Title I schools
that fail to measure up.").
205. See, e.g., VrrERITTI, supra note 8, at 209-12; Coons, supra note 52, at 20;
Overholser, supra note 15; Paul E. Peterson, A Liberal Case for Vouchers, NEW REPUBLIC,
October 4, 1999, at 29.
206. SeeVITERrmI, supra note 8.
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life. Unfortunately, attending a public school all too often
tramples that hope.0 7 It is widely recognized that America's
public schools are failing to serve many poor and minority
students. For example, as Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom
recently observed, "Today's typical black twelfth grader scores
no better on reading tests than the average white in the 8th
grade, and is 5.4 years behind the typical white in science."0 8
Among Hispanic students, the high-school dropout rate is three-
and-a-half times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites and
twice that of black students. 2°9
In some cities, student performance falls below even these
shameful levels. By many measures, the District of Columbia
operates the worst public-school system in the nation.2 10 During
the 1996-1997 school year, the District administered tests in
basic subjects and assigned all students one of four scores:
"below basic," "basic," "proficient," or "advanced." A score of
"proficient" indicated performance "at grade level." On these
tests, seventy-eight percent of fourth-grade students performed
at the "below basic" level in reading and eighty percent scored
"below basic" in math.211 Even more disturbing is the fact that
students' scores got worse, across the board, the longer they
remained in the District's public education system. 12 It appears
that the best thing that can be done for the District's students is
to take them out of the District's schools.
Not surprisingly, students who fall so far behind are less likely
to complete their education. In Washington, D.C., fifty-three
percent of all students drop out after the tenth grade. 3 And the
track record of the public schools in Milwaukee--the city with
the nation's largest school-choice program-is arguably even
worse. Of the 6,874 students who entered the Milwaukee Public
207. See Lynch, supra note 23, at 31 ("A 1997 report from the D.C. Control Board on
the city's schools concluded that 'the longer a student stays in the District's public school
system, the less likely they are to succeed.'").
208. STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE
19 (1997).
209. SeeVITEITrI, supra note 8, at 52.
210. The District's students perform far worse than all other students on the National
Assessment of Education Progress exam. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NAEP
1996 MATHEMATICS REPORT CARD FOR THE NATIONS AND THE STATES 28, 30 (1997);
NAEP 1996 SCIENCE REPORT CARD FORTHE NATIONS AND THE STATES 25-26 (1997).
211. See NINA SHOKRAII ET AL, A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION IN
THE DISTIC OF COLUMBIA 3 (1997).
212. See id.
213. SeeVITERITrI, supra note 8, at 92.
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Schools as freshmen in 1992, only 2,434, or 34%, graduated four
years later. One Milwaukee high school graduated.only 42 of its
318 entering freshman-a graduation rate of only 13%.214
Numbers like these inspire demands for reform-for
"revolutionary" change-from even the most loyal boosters of
public schools. In the end, though, these "revolutionary"
proposals invariably come down to the same old thing: demands
for more money for government-run schools and bureaucracies.
In 1999 alone, Congress allocated $1.2 billion for 100,000 new
public-school teachers; $200 million to finance "school-
community partnerships" that keep schools open after hours;
$75 million to train teachers to use technology in the classroom;
$566 million for the Safe and Drug Free Schools initiatives; $50
million to hire new bilingual-education teachers; $120 million to
finance new college-preparation and awareness programs; and
$75 million toward revising teacher-licensing policies and
practices.215 These stump-speech gems clearly reflect the wish of
many Americans for a return to a mythical era of American
public education, when-we are told--the public schools
successfully accepted the challenge of preparing a diverse
population for the rigors of adult life, inculcating sound civic
virtues, and shaping the unum that was to emerge e pluribus.216
The public schools' troubles undoubtedly stem from many
causes, but it is hard to blame them on a lack of funds. The
resources available to public schools have increased dramatically
even as the performance of these schools has declined; inflation-
adjusted per-pupil spending on public education at the
elementary and secondary levels has quadrupled since 
1950.217
Why has all this spending not purchased results?2 18 In fact,
spending more money on education rarely leads to
improvements in student performance,"9  and student
214. Enrollment and Graduation Numbers for the Class of 1996 (internal Milwaukee
Public School document, on file with authors).
215. TY2000 Major New Initiatives and Funding Opportunities (visited Mar. 6, 2000)
<http://www.ed.gov/inits/FY1999>.
216. As was described above, the homogenizing motives of the public schools' earliest
champions were somewhat less inspiring.
217. SeeVrTERlTrl, supra note 8, at 42.
218. One review of close to 400 studies of student achievement found no relationship
between student resources and achievement. See Eric A. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of
School Resources on Student Performance: An Update, EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYIsS,
Summer 1997, at 141-64.
219. See VrIERrI, supra note 8, at 41. Public-school districts nationwide employ an
average of 42 teachers for every administrator, while Washington, D.C. employs only 16
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performance is often at its worst in districts with the highest per-
pupil expenditures2 0
Given these horror stories, those who insist that more money
is all it would take to improve the prospects of public-school
students sound eerily like those greying campus radicals who
insist that communism could work, if only it were tried. And this
smattering of statistics barely scratches the surface of the
problem. Whatever good things might be said about the public
schools in Overland Park, Bethesda, or Winnetka, the schools
from which poor children are hoping to escape via choice are
failing. Indeed, they are damaging those children. We can wait
and see how things go with Vice-President Gore's proposed
"revolutionary changes," we can resign ourselves to the Sisyphus-
like task of shoring up a failed system with more well-
intentioned money-during which time we will have to explain
to the parents of today's fourth graders that they will just have to
wait -- or we can try something else.
B. The Promise of School Choice and the Catholic-School Effect
Senator Bradley was right when he observed that there is no
simple panacea to the problems that plague American public
education.2 But it is difficult, and becoming even more
difficult, to deny that religious schools are succeeding where
government schools are failing. In 1982, using Department of
Education data collected from 60,000 students at 1,016 public
and private schools, James Coleman and his colleagues found
that, even after controlling for students' family background,
and spends twice as much on its central board of education and three times as much on
the superintendent's office than peer school districts. See SHOKRAII ET AL., supra note
211, at 4. Barely 50% of the District's education expenditures go toward instruction
(compared to a still-unimpressive national average of 62%). See id. Despite high funding
levels, 12% of District classrooms started the 1996-97 school year without textbooks and
20% started without adequate supplies. See Valerie Strauss & Sari Horowitz, Students
Caught in a Cycle of Failure; WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1997, at Al.
220. Again, the hapless District of Columbia public schools spent $7,655 per pupil in
fiscal year 1996-26% above the national average, and significantly higher than the
average for other large urban districts. See SHOKRAI ET AL., supra note 211, at 4;
VrrrERMI, supra note 8, at 89.
221. See Meet the Press, supra note 1; Lynch, supra note 23, at 32 ("Rose Blassingame,
testifying before the House Budget Committee in October [1999], provided the
appropriate response to the fix-the-schools argument. After apologizing for being self-
interested, Blassingame told the congressmen about how she had heard a commentator
on the radio say it would take six or seven years to fix D.C.'s schools. Said Blassingame,
'Franciscoe doesn't have that long.'").
222. See Meet the Press, supra note 1.
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private schools produced better cognitive outcomes; provided
safer, more disciplined and more racially integrated learning
environments; offered more academically focused courses (as
opposed to vocational education); and produced students with
higher "self esteem" than did public schools. 21 Coleman's work
focused in large part on Catholic schools, which currently enroll
about fifty-one percent of all private-school students. 4 Coleman
found that "performance of children from parents with differing
educational levels is more similar in Catholic schools than in
public schools as well as being generally higher."2 He further
observed that "a similar result holds for race and ethnicity. The
achievement of blacks is closer to that of whites, and the
achievement of Hispanics is closer to that of non-Hispanics in
Catholic schools than in public schools."26 Furthermore,
attending a private school generally, and a Catholic school in
particular, had a positive effect on the educational aspiration of
students from divergent backgrounds. Indeed, "in the public
schools, the educational plans of children with college-educated
parents diverge more sharply from those of children with high-
school educated parents than is true in any other type of school.
And the divergence is least in Catholic schools." 7
Father Andrew Greeley, a sociologist and Catholic priest who
has studied the performance of minority students attending
Catholic schools for over thirty years, agreed. His analysis of the
Department of Education's 1980 "High School and Beyond"
longitudinal study of high-school students found that students of
all races attending Catholic schools showed superior
performance. 8  The results were most striking for
underprivileged and minority students. Not only did their
achievement in Catholic schools surpass that of minority
students in public schools, but the differences were the greatest
for the most disadvantaged students-those from poor families,
whose parents had a limited education, and who did not qualify
for special academic curricular programs.tm Greeley identified a
223. VITERTT, supra note 8, at 80-81.
224. See i at 82-83.
225. JAMES COLEMAN ETAL, HIGH SCHOOLACHIEVEMENT 144 (1982).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 158.
228. See ANDREW GREELEY, CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS 1-11
(1982).
229. See id. at 108 (1982).
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"Catholic school effect" that reduced the empirical connection
between demographic status and academic success."o
Choice opponents have swatted lamely at Catholic schools'
success. Putting aside unseemly objections such as, for example,
the claims that Father Greeley, as a Roman Catholic priest,
could not possibly be objective, " and that whatever benefits the
Catholic schools provide are somehow outweighed by the
harmful effects on children of Catholic religious doctrine,3 the
skeptics more often assert that the "Catholic-school effect"
identified by Greeley results more from "selection bias" than
from the schools' own merits. This so-called "cream skimming"
argument asserts that Catholic schools succeed because they are
able to accept only the best students, leaving low achievers to
languish in the public schools.2 3 But this assertion not only
ignores researchers' efforts to control for such bias, but also flies
in the face of the evidence that low-income, inner-city minority
students appear to benefit the most from Catholic schooling. As
Greeley observes, "the Catholic school effect cannot be
explained or even reduced by taking into account the fact that
Catholic schools selectively recruit from college educated
families and from students inclined toward academic
programs."m
The benefits of religious schools are not fleeting but have real
cash value; the Catholic-school effect produces dramatic results
down the line. University of Chicago economist Derek Neal
analyzed the effect of Catholic secondary schooling on college
graduation rates and future wages of minority students living in
230. See, eg., William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab, Finishing High School and
Starting College: Do Catholic Schools Make a Difference, 105 Q.J. OF ECON. 941, 944 (1995)
(concluding that there is "a great deal of support for the argument that Catholic schools
are more effective than public schools"); Sol Stem, The Invisible Miracle of Catholic Schools,
6 CrIYJ. 14 (1996).
231. SeeVrrrERrn, supra note 8, at 83.
232. SeeDWYER, supra note 199, at 19-44.
233. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, A Liberal Casefor Vouchers, NEV REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1999,
at 29 (describing, and criticizing, the "cream skimming" argument).
234. GREELEY, supra note 228, at 108. Recent studies confirm this conclusion, and
suggest instead that Catholic schools' success is due to their fostering of a sense of
community and caring, the assumption that all children are capable of learning, and a
value system premised on the assumption of the fundamental equality and dignity of all.
SeeANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1993). But see
DWYER, supra note 199, at 19-44 (arguing that the Catholic Church in its schools takes an
.aggressive approach to controlling individual thought and behavior" and that Catholic
schools, like "Fundamentalist" Christian schools, often harm children by discouraging
critical thinking).
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urban areas.' Neal found that attendance at a Catholic school
dramatically increased the probability of high-school graduation
for urban minorities.2 Furthermore, Neal found that African-
American and Hispanic students attending urban Catholic
schools were more than twice as likely to graduate from college
than their public-school counterparts.? Neal concluded that
Catholic education translated into future wage gains in the labor
market: minority students who attend urban Catholic schools
can expect to earn at least eight percent more than their public-
school counterparts.'
C. Can School Choice Capture the Catholic-School Effect?
We know that Catholic and other private, religious schools do
well serving the children who are most harmed by public
schools' failures. As author Tom Wolfe put it, "I'm not Catholic,
but I have eyes."23' Is there a way to tap into the benefits of the
Catholic-school effect through school choice? Since 1989, the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program has given low-income
students the financial means to leave the troubled Milwaukee
public schools for the participating private or religious schools
of their choice.2'0 In 1996, economist Paul Peterson and his
colleagues compared the performance of students randomly
selected to participate in the choice program to a comparable
group of students who were (due to over-subscription) randomly
rejected.24 Peterson and his colleagues disputed the earlier
235. See DEREK NEAL, EFFECT OF CATHOLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLING ON EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5353,1995).
236. The probability that an inner-city minority student would graduate from high
school increased from 62% to at least 88% when that student moved from public to
Catholic secondary school. See id. at 22.
237. Neal found that 27% of Black and Hispanic Catholic school graduates who
enrolled in college went on to graduate, compared to only 11% of urban public high
school students. See id. at 27.
238. See id. at 31.
239. John Burger, Tom Wolfe: Catholic Schools Are the Right Stuff, NAT'L CATH. REG.,
Mar. 19-25, 2000, at 3.
240. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Wis. 1998).
241. See Jay P. Greene et al., The Effectiveness of School Choice in Milwaukee: A
Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program's Evaluation (Aug. 30, 1996) (paper
prepared for presentation before the Panel on the Political Analysis of Urban School
Systems at the Aug.-Sept. 1996 meetings of the American Political Science Association,
San Francisco, Cal.) (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://data.fas.harvard.edu/pepg/op/
evaluate.htn>.
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findings of researcher John Witte2 2 and argued that Witte's
determination that the Milwaukee program had not improved
student achievement resulted from methodological flaws.
Peterson and his colleagues found that participating students
experienced significant improvements in, for example, both
reading and math:
When properly analyzed, these data indicate that choice
students, when they remain in the choice program for three to
four years, learn more than those not selected. The results
indicate that the reading scores of choice students in years
three and four, were, on average 3 and 5 percentile points
higher, respectively, than those of the control group. Math
scores were, on average 5 and 12 percentile points higher,
respectively.... These gains are not trivial. If similar success
could be achieved for all minority students nationwide, it
could close the gap separating white and minority test scores
by somewhere between one-third and more than one-half2 43
Shortly after the publication of the Peterson study, its findings
were confirmed in part by Cecilia Elena Rouse of Princeton.
Rouse also compared the test scores of students selected for the
program to those of applicants who were not selected.24 She
concluded that participation in the choice program increased
the math achievement scores of low-income, minority students
by about one to two percentage points per year.245 Additionally,
she found that students who attended a private school for some
period of time, but later returned to the Milwaukee public
schools, continued to out-perform other public-school students.
Indeed, the returning students' math test scores increased an
242. SeeJohn F. Witte, Achievement Effects of the Milwaukee Voucher Program (Jan.
4-6, 1997) (paper presented to the 1997 American Economics Ass'n Annual Meeting,
New Orleans, La.); see also John F. Witte, The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment, 20 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'YANALYSIS 229 (1998).
243. Greene et al., supra note 241.
244. Rouse's sample, however, was slightly broader than Peterson's. She included all
students who applied for the program, regardless of whether they ultimately enrolled if
selected. Peterson excluded those students who were selected but chose not to enroll. See
CECILIA ELENA ROUSE, PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: AN
EVALUATION OF THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM 4 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5964, 1997).
245. See id. at2.
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additional 1.3 percentage points per year above other students
in the public schools.
21
The jury is out on the question of whether small, pilot, school-
choice programs can consistently produce the kind of marked
improvements in participating students' performances that the
Catholic-school effect would suggest are possible. It will likely be
some time before one can speak confidently about the effects of
the Milwaukee and Cleveland choice programs on children's
education, on the religious mission of Catholic schools, and on
the now-competing government schools. But given what we
already know about the failure of urban public schools, the
success of Catholic schools, and the early indicators from choice
programs, there seem to be no good reasons not to press
ahead.247
D. Can School Choice Succeed Without Religious Schools?
School choice is attractive because, among other reasons, it
could potentially tap into the Catholic-school effect, thereby
bringing new hope to many disadvantaged students. Moreover,
the remarkable success of Catholic schools demonstrates why
real school choice must mean full school choice.
2 48 Partial
measures like charter schools and public-school-only choice will
inevitably fall short because they shut out religious schools. This
is not to say, of course, that the baby steps proposed by public-
school-choice and charter-school advocates are no better than
the status quo. What has come to be known as "the Miracle in
East Harlem" shows the amazing power of parental choice, even
when it is limited to public schools. In the early 1970s, Harlem's
District Four was home to some of the worst-performing schools
in New York City, with only sixteen percent of students reading
at grade level.249 By 1987, that figure had leaped to sixty-three
percent.2° In the interim, a frustrated central administration
246. See id. at 3. Rouse was unable to replicate the positive results for reading scores
set forth in the earlier study. Instead, she found that "results for reading scores were
quite mixed." Id. at 32.
247. See Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47, 72-73
(1998) ("Despite the rhetoric and scare tactics, choice critics have failed to offer much
evidence that school choice will balkanize America.").
248. SeeVITRrI, supra note 8, at 82-86.
249. See RAYMOND DoMoNico, MODEL FOR CHOIcE: A REPORT ON MANHATrAN'S
DiSTRICT 4 (Education Policy Paper, Manhattan Institute, 1989).
250. See id.
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bent to the will of several inspired educators who promised to
turn the district around by nurturing alternative schools built
around curricular "themes," permitting parents to choose
among these options rather than assigning students based upon
geography alone.2" In 1998, an extensive evaluation of the
program found that, since 1974, reading and math scores had
improved significantly in comparison to the other districts in the
city, even after controlling for socioeconomic variables.2 The
researchers identified choice as the key causal factor,
concluding that poor parents are intelligent shoppers who
choose schools that reflect their personal values and the unique
needs of their children.253
Early experience in the states that permit "charter
schools"--public schools that are, in theory, permitted to
operate with relative autonomy from the central school
bureaucracy--provides additional support for the argument
that some choice is better than none. North Carolina's first
charter school, the Healthy Start Academy, has ten classrooms in
a church basement, divided by paper-thin walls. 5 One hundred
sixty-eight of its one hundred seventy students are black. 2 %
Eighty percent of the students qualify for free lunches; seventy-
five percent come from single-parent homes.5 7 When Healthy
Start's second graders enrolled in the fall of 1997, they scored in
the thirty-fourth percentile of the five million children who took
the nation-wide Iowa Test of Basic Skills.m By the following May,
they scored in the seventy-fifth percentile.2 9 The test scores of
Healthy Start's kindergartners rocketed even higher, rising from
the forty-second percentile to the ninety-ninth. 210 "When I
announced these scores at an assembly, moms were crying,"
Healthy Start's principal recalls, "grandmas and grandpas were
251. SeeVrrERrnm, supra note 8, at 61.
252. See Mark Schneider et al., Shcppingfor Schools: In the Land of the Blind, the One-EyedParent May Be Enough, 42 AM.J. POL. SC. 769 (1998).
253. See id.
254. Seesupra note 46 and accompanying text.
255. See Deroy Murdock, Numbers Game: North Carolina Educrats May Shut Down theSuccessful Healthy Start Charter School Because It Enrolls Too Many Blacks, REASON, Oct. 1998,
at 58, 58.
256. See id.
257. See N.C. Charter School Ranks High for Math, Reading NEIVS & REC. (Greensboro,
NO),June 19, 1999, at B13.
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crying and yelling. Theirs were kids who never heard anything
good from schools."61 The following year, Healthy Start
improved this record; its kindergartners and second-graders
scored in the ninety-ninth percentile.22 Third graders, all of
whom were new to the school that year, ranked in the eighty-first
percentile.6
Notwithstanding these success stories, the fact remains that in
our most troubled neighborhoods, religious schools have
consistently succeeded in breaking down the economic and
racial barriers that still divide students in our public schools,
turning underprivileged and disaffected youngsters into aspiring
young scholars. Excluding religious schools from a choice
program means placing schools like Milwaukee's Messmer High
School out of financial reach for the students who need them
most. Messmer, an independent Catholic high school in inner-
city Milwaukee, has succeeded with the students who are most at
risk of failure. The overwhelming majority of Messmer's students
are Latino or African-American; most of them are poor; many
come from broken homes; and some have been expelled from
public schools for gangs, drugs, and violence. Yet, thanks to
the no-nonsense, tough-love philosophy of their principal,
Brother Bob Smith, ninety-eight percent of Messmer students
graduate on time.'6 Eighty percent of those who graduate go on
to attend college26 in a city where less than thirty-five percent of
students who attend public schools graduate from high school in
four years.267 Leaving aside the question of whether the
Constitution permits religious schools like Messmer to be
excluded from otherwise generally available choice programs,
26
it seems clear that choice will work best only if students have a
chance to choose religious schools.
School choice is often called an "experiment." Granted, not









268. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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weight of the evidence shows that choice in education can
improve the opportunities for those who most need it. Any
effort to exploit the potential of school choice that rules out the
tremendous benefits of our nation's religious schools might
improve the current system, but it will likely fall well short of
what could be attained. But real school choice-
nondiscriminatory, religion-neutral, pluralism-embracing school
choice-seems to work. Can we be sure? Probably not:
"[T]heoretically the effect of market competition is measurable
empirically, but no, we cannot fully assess it under the existing
plans."2 9 Still, in Professor Joseph Viteritti's words, "the most
compelling argument for choice remains a plea for fairness. We
don't need numbers to prove that."20
E. Religious Schools, Racial Integration, and the Promise ofEquality
The success of Messmer and other inner-city Catholic schools
led James Coleman and his colleagues to observe that:
Catholic schools more nearly approximate the "common
school" ideal of American education than do public schools, in
that the achievement levels of students from different parental
educational backgrounds, of black and white students, and ofHispanic and non-Hispanic white students are more nearly
alike in Catholic schools than in public schools. In addition
the educational aspirations of students from different parental
backgrounds are more alike in Catholic than in public
schools.2'
This is a crucially important observation. One of the more
common arguments against school choice is that it would
exacerbate racial separatism and undo four decades of
integration efforts, running contrary to our ideal of the public
school as an important part of the project of building a cohesive
and united America.
It is an ugly fact that, after Brown, many whites fled the public
schools for all-white "academies," not because the public schools
were failing, but because they did not want their children to
attend school with blacks.2 7 The apparent historical connection
269. Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: Beyond the Numbers, EDUC. WIt, Feb. 23, 2000, at
38,44.
270. Id.
271. COLEmAN ErAL., supra note 225, at 185.
272. See, e.g., VrrERnrm, supra note 8, at 30-31.
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between the flight from public to private schools, as well as the
connection in many people's minds between vouchers and the
increasingly white, southern Republican Party, causes many to
oppose today's choice proposals as little more than Jim Crow in
23
new clothes. Conjuring up images of the "white academies"
formed during the period of massive Southern resistance to
forced integration, choice opponents assert that school choice
will lead to the "resegregation" of American education by
enabling white students to flee failing public schools for lily-
white private schools.24
In fact, though, the evidence indicates that school choice
would likely result in more students learning in more integrated
settings. Indeed, it is hard to see how choice could result in
more segregation. Nearly half a century after the Supreme
Court's Brown decision declaring de jure segregation
unconstitutional, the classrooms in most central-city public-
school districts remain overwhelmingly segregated.2
5 In the
twenty-five largest central cities in the United States, the
percentage of school-age children who were white dropped from
84.5% in 1950 to 48.7% in 1980.276 Nationwide, a majority of
children who attend public schools do so in a segregated
setting. 7 Although it is true that private schools enroll fewer
minority students than public schools, within individual schools,
blacks and whites are substantially more integrated than in the
private sector. Thus, as Coleman and his colleagues observe,
policies making private schools financially accessible to low-
income students would integrate schools both racially and
economically: "Such policies could bring more blacks,
Hispanics, and students from lower income backgrounds into
private schools, thus reducing between-sector segregation, and
273. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of
Choctaw County, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1992) (describing Southern segregation
academies as the first schools of choice); Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School Tuition
Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359 (1997).
274. SeeHershkoff& Cohen, supra note 273; O'Brien, supra note 273.
275. SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Lost Promise of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 4, at 1
(reporting data showing that "black students became increasingly isolated in the 1990s").
276. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLICEDUCATION 176 (1993).
277. See VITERrm, supra note 8, at 49. The suggestions of some choice critics that one
cannot reconcile choice with diversity therefore appear misguided. It seems more
consistent with the data to argue that one cannot have diversity without choice. Cf
Rosen, supra note 275.
Texas Review of Law & Politics Vol. 4
these students would be moving from a sector of high racial
segregation into a sector of low racial segregation. ""'
Furthermore, recent research suggests that school choice
would not only result in minority students moving to more
integrated learning environments, but it would also increase the
type of integration that truly counts--social interaction between
students of different racial and ethnic groups. In a paper
delivered to the American Political Science Association in 1998,
Jay Greene and Nicole Mellow found that students attending
private schools were more likely to voluntarily socialize with
students of different races than their public-school
counterparts. Greene and Mellow observed the lunchroom
groupings of 4,302 students (2,864 public-school students and
1,438 private-school students).2 They found that, in private-
school lunchrooms, 63.5% of the students ate in integrated
groups.2 ' In public schools, only 49.7% of all students ate in
integrated groups.22
It is undoubtedly true that some, perhaps many, black parents
would choose to send their children to private schools that
work---without regard to their racial makeup. Some might even
prefer to send their children to majority-black schools that
emphasize racial pride. In our view, though, choice opponents
should not be too quick to dismiss these preferences as
illegitimate. Consider the bizarre, Alice-in-Wonderland plight of
Durham's Healthy Start Academy. Soon after the release of its
remarkable test results (discussed above), Healthy Start found
itself caught in a political squabble that focused on everything
but the well-being of its students. State administrators
278. COLEMAN E" AL, supra note 225, at 184; see also JAY P. GREENE, BUCKEY INST.,CHOICE AND COMMUNITY: THE RACIAL, ECONOMIC, AND RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OFPARENTAL CHOICE IN CLEVELAND (1999) (describing research indicating that private
schools attended by voucher recipients in Cleveland are more integrated thanCleveland's public schools); Milwaukee School-ChoiceProgram Racially Mixed, AMERICA, Feb.26, 2000, at 5, 5 ("A Wisconsin audit shows that the racial composition of studentsparticipating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is almost exactly the same as
that of the Milwaukee public schools.").
279. Jay P. Greene & Nicole Mellow, Integration Where it Counts: A Study of RacialIntegration in Public and Private School Lunchrooms (visited Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://wvw.schoolchoices.org/roo/jayl/htn>.
280. See id.
281. See id. Green and Mellow considered a lunchroom group "integrated" if at least
one of five students was of a different race. See id.
282. See id.
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threatened to close the school because it 
was "too black." 213
Proponents of this drastic action claimed that Healthy Start ran
afoul of the charter-school law's "diversity" clause. 'While the
clause ostensibly was enacted to placate fears that charter
schools would become a new generation of white-ffight
academies, the opposite occurred. Thirteen of the thirty-four
charter schools that opened in North Carolina in 1997 were
disproportionately black (compared to their districts).28a By the
following year, at least twenty-two of the State's sixty charter
schools ran afoul of the charter law's diversity clause, which
requires charter schools to "reasonably reflect" the
demographics of the district that they serve because of their
disproportionately minority student bodies.286 Obviously, it was
not affluent white parents who were searching for an
educational alternative to the public schools.
In any event, not only do religious schools better comport
with our integration ideals, but, as Joseph Viteritti recently
argued,287 school choice offers the best hope for achieving the
promise of equality that the Supreme Court embraced in Brown.
The Court in Brown was clear: "It is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right that must be made
available to all on equal terms ."2 ' Although the Supreme Court
would later decline to extrapolate from Brown a* public211
obligation to provide equal education to rich and poor,
litigation and activism in some states, aimed at equalizing
educational opportunities, has led to significant changes in the
financing of public education.a But if, as it appears, the answer
to the lack of equality in education is not simply more funding,
it could be that empowering low-income and minority parents to
283. Murdock, supra note 255.
284. Id.
285. See David J. Dent, Diversity Rules Threaten North Carolina Charter Schools That Aid
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at B8.
286. Id.
287. SeeVITERiTr, supra note 8, at 25-28.
288. Id. at 493.
289. San Antonio Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973) ("The Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.").
290. SeVrrERrr, supra note 8, at 37-42; James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999);James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109
YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
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act in their children's best interests is the surest way to make
good on Brown's promise.
F. School Choice, Civic Virtue, and the Common-School Ideal
It is also sometimes argued that school choice, whatever its
perceived educational benefits, would be unduly "privatizing." It
is said that private and religious schools, unlike our public
schools, encourage and perpetuate narrowness, sectarianism,
and a lack of public and civic engagement.9 These arguments
often build on negative stereotypes about religious, especially
evangelical and "fundamentalist," Christian schools.2 The fear
is that school choice would exacerbate the "bowling alone"
phenomenon of withdrawal from public life that has troubled
many commentators. If such charges were true, they would
weigh heavily against educational choice. But they are not:
Recent survey data from the U.S. Department of Education
show that Catholic, Protestant, and nonreligious private
schooling and home schooling families are consistently more
involved in a wide spectrum of civic activities than are families
of public school children. From voting to volunteering to
visiting the local library, private and home schooling families
are very much out in their communities and involved in the
affairs of public life. Private schooling, it turns out, is anything
but privatizing. 
2 4
Similarly, many opponents argue that school choice
represents the abandonment of an American ideal-the mythic
"common school." 5 This argument is predicated on the idea
291. See, e.g., AMY GUTYMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 121 (1987) (Education must
'convert children away from the intensely held beliefs of their parents."); see also BRUCEACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); DWYER, supra note 199;STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES (1990). For detailed critiques of these arguments,
see, for example, Stephen G. Gilles, Hey Christians! Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST.COMMENTARY 149 (1999); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937 (1996).
292. See, e.g., DW1M, supra note 199, at 16-19; ALAN PESHKIN, GOD'S CHOICE: THETOTAL WORLD OF A FUNDAMENTAIST CHRIsTIAN SCHOOL (1986); SUSAN ROSE, KEEPING
THEM OUT OF THE HANDS OF SATAN: EVANGELICAL SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1988).
293. See, e.g., Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capita4 6 J.DEMOCRACY 65 (1995); Robert D. Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic America, 24
AM. PROSPECr 34, 34 (1996).
294. Christian Smith & David Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing?, FIRST THINGS,
April 1999, at 16, 16.
295. Peter Beinart, Degree of Separation, NLv REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1997, at 6, 6; RalphBennet, Editorial, Educational Separatism is Destructive SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 27,
m . .. ......
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that, by educating people from all backgrounds and inculcating
a shared set of American values, the public schools provide the
glue that holds our diverse polity together. Thus, public
education is a critical component of our grand experiment with
democracy. By ceasing the struggle to preserve the ideal of the
common school, the argument goes, Americans resign
themselves to the inevitable Balkanization of their diverse and
multi-cultural society.
But it is crucial to remember that public or civic engagement
does not require involvement in government-run institutions. As
Tocqueville emphasized, and many "civil society" thinkers have
re-discovered, a "thick" and vibrant democracy requires
mediating institutions, voluntary associations, and other vehicles
for other-directed activity and commitments to serve as buffers
between the individual and the state. 6 Those who fear that
private schools undermine civil society conflate civil society with
the state. In fact, civil society is well served by private schools.
The Department of Education's 1996 National Household
Education Survey received information from 9,393 parents of
school-age children in a wide variety of schools about their
membership in community organizations, volunteer activities,
voting habits, political involvement, activism, and attendance at
public lectures and speeches: "The results reveal a consistent
pattern: Catholic schooling families, other Christian schooling
families, nonreligious private schooling families, and home
schooling families are consistently more involved in all of the
civic activities examined than are families with children in public
schools."" 7
G. School Choice, Empowerment, and the Dignity of the Poor
School choice first hit policy wonks' radar screens in
1955-one year after the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown-when economist Milton Friedman proposed replacing
the public-school system with a universal system of publicly
1993, at B5; James W. Ceaser & Patrick J. McGuinn, Civic Education Reconsidered, PuB.
INTEREST, Sept. 22, 1998, at 84, 91.
296. See Smith & Sikkink, supra note 294, at 17 ("American democracy thrives on the
widespread participation of its citizens in a host of different kinds of associations that
mediate between the individual and the state, often even when those associations are not
manifestly political or liberal; ... the experience of association and participation itself
tends to socialize, empower, and incorporate citizens in ways that stimulate democratic
self-government, even if they involve some particularity and conflict in the process.").
297. Id. at 18.
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funded vouchers.2s Although Friedman's free-market ideology
has proved a useful incubator for the school-choice idea, the
case for school choice cannot be reduced to a purely utilitarian
one. Instead, school choice will work largely because it enlists
the very individuals who are most in tune with the needs of
young students--their parents.
In recent years, the public schools' defenders have taken to
laying much of the blame for the failure of urban public
education at the feet of poor parents. They attribute, for
example, the public schools' abysmal performance to a lack of
parental involvement in their children's education.m Ironically,
those who assert that parental involvement is the key to public-
school reform also claim that poor parents are too irresponsible
to make sound decisions about their children's education. The
assertions that poor parents are lost without the paternalistic
guidance of the "experts" in a school district's central
administration building is not only insulting but also disregards
basic common sense. Surely parents, even disadvantaged
parents, know their children's needs better than bureaucrats do.
Parents welcome responsibility; they are tired of being
subjects.a° Consider the remarkable enthusiasm generated by
privately funded programs that provide private-school
scholarships to low-income children."m Recall also that John
Witte, who was commissioned by the State of Wisconsin to
evaluate the effectiveness of Milwaukee's school-choice program,
concluded that the experiment did not significantly improve
student performancem 2 (Again, however, his conclusions have
been criticized by others.) 5 Witte also concluded that "[c]hoice
creates enormous enthusiasm among parents, [although]
298. See Milton Friedman, The Roe of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLICINTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
299. See NBC Nightly News: Interview with National Educational Association President Bob
Chase (NBC television broadcastJune 9, 1998).
300. In the 1999 poll conducted by the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, only 39.7% of African-Americans rated their public schools as excellent or good,
compared to 59.0% of the population as a whole. See DAVID A. Bosms, JOINT CrR. FOR
POL & ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1999 NATIONAL OPINION POLL: EDUCATION 5 (1999).
301. See, e.g., WF Announces: 1,000 New Scholarships for 1998!, WASH. SCHOLARSHIP
FUND NEWS (Washington Scholarship Fund, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1997, at 1;
Washington Scholarship Fund, History (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www/wsf-dc.org>;
Forstmann, supra note 20.
302. SeeJohn F. Witte et al., Fifth-Year Report: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (visited
Mar. 2, 2000) <http://www.lafo]Iette.wisc.edu/outreach/pubs/ffthyear/executive.htr>,
303. See generally Greene et al., supra note 241.
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student achievement fails to rise."" Witte failed to appreciate
that the "enormous enthusiasm among parents" generated by
choice is intrinsically valuable. These newly "enthusiastic"
parents and their children were, prior to the enactment of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the outsiders--the
experimental subjects-in American education. Their children
were trapped in substandard schools. Their efforts to voice
frustrations fell on the deaf ears of entrenched bureaucrats. The
teachers unions and their allies used them as convenient
scapegoats when asked to explain the public schools' spiraling
decline. But when Governor Tommy Thompson signed the
legislation creating the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, he
transformed the lives of these parents by giving them-perhaps
for the first time-the ability to control their children's destiny.
John Coon's short 1992 piece "School Choice as Simple
Justice," cuts to the heart of the matter. ° He passionately makes
the case that choice in education should not and cannot be
treated as just another free-market fad, a "tool of supply side
economics," an "efficiency device aimed primarily at economic
growth."' 6 He wrote:
[T]he case for choice in education goes much deeper than
market efficiency .... Shifting educational authority from
government to parents is a policy that rests upon basic beliefs
about the dignity of the person, the rights of children, and the
sanctity of the family; it is a shift that also promises a harvest of
social trust as the experience of responsibility is extended to
all....
Choice ... needs to be loved for its own sake, or at least for
a reason more noble than its capacity to make life better for
the producers. In fact, there are larger reasons for believing in
choice-reasons equal in dignity to those that underlie our
great constitutional freedoms.Y
Our nation's poor are too often treated, even by the most well
meaning education bureaucrats and committed public-chool
teachers, more as problems to be solved than as persons, more
as clients than as co-citizens. "How can we better help them?" is
304. Id. at 1.
305. Coons, supra note 52, at 15.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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the question tooften posed. Too often, plan after plan is
hatched to limit underprivileged parents' influence over
children, while expanding the government's. Inevitably, as
Coons observed, "parents learn that they are not trusted; they
are not taken seriously. Society tells them instead that even utter
strangers are better judges of the school that is most suitable for
their child.""
H. Religious Freedom and Parental Expression
A common theme in today's political debate-consider the
issue of campaign finance reform-4s that the poor lack a voice
in the public arena. Yet we often forget that parents' educational
choices are often as expressive, both to their children and to the
world, as any other kind of speech:
Schools that are freely chosen are the proxies for parental
ideas that seek entry into the public dialogue. Today those
who can afford to do so often choose a school precisely
because it preserves and projects a certain deposit of
belief.... The school is a loudspeaker for those who freely
support it with their presence and wish to cooperate in its
message.
The non-rich are presently denied this medium of
expression. They are conscripted for schools that impose upon
them a narrow curriculum produced by a political process.30
Many of those who oppose choice know this; indeed, it is
sometimes why they oppose choice.10 They recognize that the
education of children is not neutral; it cannot and should not be
a purely technical task. Education shapes and forms the citizens
that today's students will become. Those who claim for the state
the moral authority to control the formation of its citizens
prefer, like Horace Mann, James Blaine, and Thomas Dewey
before them, that the state rather than poor parents-and
especially rather than poor religious parents-monopolize that
coercive authority."'
308. Id. at 16.
309. Id. at 17.
310. "Critics of choice... assert that, by expressing their preferences in education,
the poor will foment ideas that are dangerous to society." Id. at 19.
311. See id. at 19 ("The machinery of public monopoly was chosen specifically by
brahmins like Horace Mann and James Blaine to coax the children of immigrants from
the religious superstitions of their barbarian parents. Today that antique machinery
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Surely of all the mediating, teaching, and values-inculcating
institutions, the family is primary, both in time and in
112importance. Just as groups must be able to control their
message to the world, free from unjustified government
intrusion into their membership, rituals, and commitments, so
should the decisions of parents to control and shape their
family's character formation be unfettered by intrusive and
unwarranted government second-guessing. Denying educational
choice, as a means of controlling the messages transmitted to
other people's children, is intellectual kidnapping.""' It is not the
proper business of a truly liberal state.
14
Given our professed constitutional commitment to religious
liberty, granting the state a monopoly on the content of the
educational message children receive is particularly troubling.1
Indeed, courts and commentators sometimes fail to remember
that Meyer and Pierce, which were decided at a time of hostility to
the culture, language, and religion of many immigrants,31 6 were
meant to safeguard the rights of religious and ethnic minorities.
These decisions serve as clear statements of parents' rights to
build a family culture and shape the character of their children.
As Joseph Viteritti observes, "[t] he calculus of religious liberty
in a free society is determined by the measure of religiously
motivated thought and action that is insulated from public
authority." 17 Real school choice expands that measure. It
continues its designated role, and if this function was ever benign, it has long since
ceased to be so.").
312. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural."); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (noting important role of the family in "promot[ing] a way of life
through the instruction of children").
313. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (noting that the law at
issue would "deprive parents of a fair opportunity to procure for their children
instruction which they think important and we cannot say is harmful"); see generally
Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937
(1996) (arguing that the coercive funding of public schools interferes with parental
educative speech).
314. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) ("Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not
legitimize use of the [government's] power to compel the speaker to alter the message
by including one more acceptable to others.").
315. As some of the Supreme Court's decisions illustrate, the fundamental "liberty"
rights of parents to direct and control their children's upbringing will in many cases
complement religious-freedom rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233.34 (1972).
316. See, e.g., VIERITrT, supra note 8, at 151-56 (1999).
317. Id. at 165.
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appreciates that, for many parents and children, education is a
religious, and not merely a secular or civil, enterprise. The
perceived secular and, at times, overtly anti-religious tone of
public education requires these parents to pay what is essentially
a tax on their religious objections. They pay tuition to a private
school in addition to the taxes they already pay to support
government schools. The imposition of burdens on religious
belief, the drive toward homogenization, and the undermining
of minority religious views are illiberal, as well as unnecessary.
Choice, on the other hand, frees more religious expression from
public authority by enhancing choice and expression generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutional arguments against school choice are
misplaced. Religious schools and institutions are entitled to the
same respect accorded government schools. We know that those
who are not being served by public schools want choice, but are
opposed by those who-whether for reasons of economic self-
interest, attachment to common-school myths, or misguided
constitutional interpretation-insist that poor children must
continue to be thrown over the trench walls like so much
cannon fodder. Indeed, the most common anti-school-choice
argument goes something like this: 'We can't permit school
choice, because vouchers will take children, and therefore
money, away from the public schools, where both are
desperately needed."3
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In response to this argument, Eugene Volokh has observed
that the Constitution "does not have a You May Not Hurt
Government-Run Schools Clause."3 9 What is more, it is not at all
clear, given that vouchers under school-choice programs are
invariably worth less than the cost of public-school education, 20
that the public schools are hurt (at least financially) when a
child manages to escape. In any event, one would hope that, for
those who care about the well-being of children, the governing
consideration would be what is best for children, not what is best
for public schools:
318. Meet the Press, supra note I (Vice-President Gore speaking).
319. Volokh, supra note 35, at 360.
320. See id. at 361-62 & n.41.
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Students shouldn't be means to the end of improving
government schools-government schools should be a means
to the end of improving each student. Good students aren't
just tools that are available for the government to use in order
to improve the quality of its schools (or even to improve the
quality of education of other, not-so-good students). It's wrong
to deprive the good students of educational choices so they
can remain trapped in government schools for the
government schools' benefit. Even if there are good
arguments for not helping parents who choose to send their
kids to private schools, "we need your kid at the government
school to make the school better" is not one of them.2
As William Raspberry asks, "[I]ook at it from the viewpoint of
those parents who grab so avidly for the chance to get their
children into better schools: Should they be required to keep
their children in dreadful schools in order to keep those schools
from growing even worse?"22 No. The claim that "we need your
child to prop up the public schools" is, from a moral point of
view, no more palatable, and should be no more convincing,
than any other hostage-taking arguments
School choice is merely the educational-policy equivalent of
the "Golden Rule." The children of the poor should not be
required or even consigned to attend schools that policy-makers
would not permit their own children to attend. The children of
the poor should not be treated as pawns or their interests
sacrificed to appease an outdated, and increasingly harmful,
monopoly. Public funds are collected and should be spent to
advance the educational interests of children, not the special
interests of government-employee unions. School choice is not
"sectarian" or "conservative." It is not just about profit,
efficiency, or competition. It is aboutjustice.
321. Id. at 361.
322. William Raspberry, Not Enough Lifeboats, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,1998, atA19.
323. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John
Ladd trans., Macmillan 1985) (1797) ("[A] human being can never be manipulated
merely as a means to the purposes of someone else . . ").
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